Section 24 HMA appeals converted to writ petitions pending Larger Bench ruling on maintainability.

This bunch of appeals was filed to challenge various orders passed by Family Courts under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), which pertains to maintenance pendente lite.

The respondents raised a common preliminary objection regarding maintainability, arguing that an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, does not lie against a Section 24 HMA order because such orders are interlocutory in nature.

The procedural history reflects conflicting precedents: a 2010 Division Bench in Ajay Malik v. Smt. Shashi held such appeals were not maintainable; however, a 2018 Full Bench in Kavita Vyas v. Deepak Dave held they were maintainable.

Subsequently, in 2022, a Division Bench in Amit Vyas v. Pramila @ Ranjana doubted the Full Bench view in light of Supreme Court observations in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and referred the question to a Larger Bench, which remains pending.

1. Whether an order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is a "judgment" or an "interlocutory order," and consequently, whether an appeal against such an order is maintainable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

2. Whether the Division Bench should adjudicate the pending appeals on merits or maintainability while a reference to a Larger Bench on the same question of law is still awaited.

Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, regarding interim maintenance.

Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which provides for appeals and revisions but excludes interlocutory orders.

The doctrine of per incuriam as summarized in Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma [(2017) 14 SCC 722].

The principle of judicial discipline and propriety, which requires a smaller Bench to refrain from deciding matters when a reference to a Larger Bench is pending.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which grants High Courts wide powers to issue directions or orders for the enforcement of rights or "for any other purpose".

The Court noted that the jurisdiction of the Division Bench to entertain these appeals is currently "clouded" by the pending reference to a Larger Bench regarding the correctness of the Kavita Vyas Full Bench decision.

It held that judicial discipline prevents them from rendering a determination on maintainability or merits that might conflict with the eventual decision of the Larger Bench.

The Court emphasized that "justice delayed is justice denied," noting that these cases have lingered due to legal uncertainty.

Since Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act expressly excludes such orders from revisional jurisdiction, the Court found a "workable solution" in Article 226 of the Constitution.

By treating these matters under its extraordinary writ jurisdiction rather than as statutory appeals, the Court could bypass the maintainability hurdle under Section 19 and ensure an expeditious hearing on the merits.

It disposed of the appeals by remanding them to the Registry to be re-registered as Single Bench petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for disposal on merits.

The Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) to bring the pending 2022 reference to the notice of the Acting Chief Justice to expedite the constitution of the Larger Bench.