Section 25-B(8) revision cannot introduce fresh factual grounds or substitute the Rent Controller’s permissible findings.

The Respondent-landlord instituted an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, concerning a shop measuring approximately 7’9” × 4’7” forming part of Property No. 1030 (part), Gali Teliyan, Tilak Bazar, Delhi.

The Petitioner-tenant sought leave to defend, contending, inter alia, that the Respondent and his family members owned several commercial properties and more than 56 shops, and therefore had reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

The Respondent disclosed that the first and second floors of the same property were vacant but asserted that they were unsuitable because there was no staircase and access was only through temporary iron ladders in a damaged condition.

The learned ARC dismissed the leave-to-defend application and passed an eviction order, holding that no triable issue arose regarding bona fide requirement or alternative accommodation.

The tenant challenged that order under Section 25-B(8) of the Act, confining the revision to the issue of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

Whether the Petitioner’s general assertion that the Respondent and his family members owned several properties and shops raised a triable issue regarding the availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation?

Whether the vacant first and second floors of Property No. 1030 (part), despite the alleged absence of a staircase and reliance on damaged temporary ladders, constituted reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for the Respondent’s pleaded business requirement?

Whether the learned ARC’s finding on alternative accommodation disclosed jurisdictional error, perversity, material irregularity, or manifest illegality warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Act?

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Under Section 14(1)(e), eviction may be ordered where the landlord bona fide requires the premises and has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

The proviso to Section 25-B(8) confers a limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, not an appellate jurisdiction.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, the Court held that interference is justified only for an error apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, procedural illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or absence of adjudication; the High Court cannot merely substitute its view for that of the Rent Controller.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover for the restricted scope of revision under Section 25-B(8).

The Court held that the tenant’s assertion regarding numerous properties owned by the Respondent and his family was vague and did not identify any particular premises owned by the Respondent that was available for his use or reasonably capable of fulfilling the pleaded business requirement.

The specific contention concerning the vacant first and second floors was also not raised before the ARC in a sufficiently specific manner and therefore could not be introduced as a fresh factual controversy in revision.

In any event, vacancy alone did not establish reasonable suitability; the Respondent had explained that the floors lacked a staircase and could be accessed only by damaged temporary ladders.

The ARC had considered the Respondent’s requirement for the subject shop along with the adjoining shop, noted that the other properties were tenanted, and found that no alternative accommodation fulfilling that requirement had been identified.

Since that conclusion was neither perverse nor manifestly erroneous, reassessing the suitability of the upper floors would amount to impermissible appellate review.

It held that the general assertion regarding the Respondent’s properties did not raise a triable issue and that the vacant upper floors were not shown to be reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

The learned ARC’s decision did not suffer from jurisdictional error, perversity, material irregularity, or manifest illegality warranting revision under Section 25-B(8).

Accordingly, the Rent Control Revision Petition was dismissed, and the impugned eviction order dated 11 November 2025 was left undisturbed; all pending applications were also disposed of.