Section 25-B(8) revision cannot reappreciate evidence absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity.

The Petitioners, claiming to be tenants, challenged an order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the learned ARC-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in RC ARC No. 236/2024. The ARC dismissed their applications for leave to defend and consequently passed an eviction order in favour of the Respondents under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, concerning part of premises bearing Nos. 219–220, A&B, Ward XIX, Daya Basti, Sarai Rohilla, Old Rohtak Road, New Delhi.

The Petitioners limited their challenge to two grounds: first, that the Respondents lacked ownership of Property No. 220-B, which formed part of the subject premises, particularly because the Petitioners had paid property tax in respect of it; and second, that the Respondents’ alleged bona fide requirement to establish an air-pistol shooting range was not genuine or legally sustainable in the absence of licences, permissions or no-objection certificates.

The Respondents contended that the Petitioners’ admitted status as tenants prevented them from disputing the Respondents’ title, that payment of property tax did not confer ownership, and that the ARC had expressly considered the objection regarding permissions for the proposed shooting range. The High Court heard the Revision Petition finally with the consent of the parties.

Whether the Petitioners’ reliance on payment of property tax and their challenge to the Respondents’ title raised a triable issue requiring grant of leave to defend.

Whether the absence of an existing licence, permission or NOC for establishing an air-pistol shooting range rendered the Respondents’ alleged bona fide requirement legally untenable or raised a triable issue.

Whether the ARC’s order suffered from jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction and cannot reassess evidence or substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, the Court held that interference is warranted only for an error apparent on the face of the record, failure of adjudication, jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity.

For eviction under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord need not prove absolute ownership as in a title suit, but must establish a title better than that of the tenant; a tenant is generally estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying the landlord’s title during the tenancy, as explained in Rajender Kumar Sharma v. Smt. Leela Wati, 155 (2008) DLT 383, Sh. Bharat Bhushan v. Arti Teckchandani, 2008 (153) DLT 247, and Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450.

Mere payment of property tax does not confer ownership or alter the landlord-tenant relationship, as recognised in G.D. Seigell & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Swarn Nijhawan & Ors., 2024:DHC:7323.

The Court further accepted the principle that the DRC Act does not require a landlord to disclose the exact nature of the proposed business or to establish that every regulatory permission has already been obtained at the leave-to-defend stage, relying on H.S. Banka v. Mohan Lal, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6372, and Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaid Khatun, AIR 1995 SC 576.

On ownership, the Court held that the Petitioners’ admitted status as tenants prevented them from disputing the Respondents’ title merely because the Respondents had not established absolute ownership. The ARC had applied the correct test—whether the Respondents possessed a title better than that of the tenants—and had correctly rejected the title objection as non-triable.

The ARC’s reference to an “electricity bill” instead of a “property tax” payment was treated as an obvious typographical error because the relevant material and the authority cited concerned property tax. In any event, payment of property tax could not establish ownership or alter the tenancy relationship.

Regarding the shooting range, the Court noted that the ARC had expressly considered the Petitioners’ objection concerning the absence of licences, permissions and NOCs and had found no cogent material showing that such permissions were prerequisites before establishment of the proposed activity.

Determining afresh whether particular regulatory permissions would ultimately be required would involve reappreciation of evidence, which exceeded the limited scope of revision under Section 25-B(8). The relevant question was only whether the ARC had failed to consider the defence or reached a perverse or legally untenable conclusion; no such defect was established.

Finding no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity in the ARC’s order, the Court dismissed the Revision Petition and disposed of the pending applications, including the stay application, without any order as to costs.