Section 25-B(8) revision cannot reappreciate evidence absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity.

The Petitioner was a tenant in premises claimed by the Respondents, who instituted an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, seeking the premises for running a law office.

The Petitioner sought leave to defend, contending that there was no landlord–tenant relationship because he had not attorned to the Respondents, that the Respondents had initially pleaded a requirement for a confectionery shop and later amended it to a law office, and that suitable alternative accommodation, including a lawyers’ chamber and other properties, was available.

By order dated 7 April 2026, the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the application for leave to defend and passed an eviction order.

The ARC held that the Petitioner’s own pleadings acknowledged that the Respondents’ grandfather and father had been landlords; that the Respondents had established a bona fide requirement for a law office; and that no suitable alternative accommodation had been shown.

The Petitioner challenged that order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Whether the Petitioner raised a triable issue by disputing the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship on the ground that he had not attorned to the Respondents?

Whether the Respondents’ amended requirement for using the premises as a law office was bona fide, despite the earlier pleading that the premises were required for a confectionery shop?

Whether the alleged alternative accommodations—including a lawyers’ chamber, a residence-cum-office, and two other shops—were reasonably suitable and available to the Respondents?

Whether the ARC’s dismissal of the leave-to-defend application and grant of eviction suffered from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, manifest illegality, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Section 25-B(8)?

The Court applied Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which eviction may be ordered where the landlord requires the premises bona fide and has no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation, and the summary leave-to-defend procedure under Section 25-B.

Under the proviso to Section 25-B(8), the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction and cannot re-appreciate evidence as an appellate court; interference is justified only for jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, manifest illegality, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

This principle was drawn from Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, concerning the restricted scope of revision.

For bona fide requirement and alternative accommodation, the Court applied the principle that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his or her requirement and that the tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the premises should be utilised, relying on Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679, and Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353.

The Court held that the Petitioner’s own leave-to-defend application acknowledged that the Respondents’ grandfather was the original landlord and that rent had subsequently been received by their father.

Consequently, the plea of non-attornment or payment to another family member did not negate the Respondents’ superior title or establish a triable issue.

The change from a proposed confectionery shop to a law office did not, by itself, establish mala fides; the Respondents’ status as practising advocates was admitted, and no material showed that the asserted requirement for a law office was fanciful or a device to obtain eviction.

The ARC had separately examined each alleged alternative accommodation: the Tis Hazari chamber was not shown to be sufficient for three advocates; the Pandit Park property was primarily residential and its suitability as an office was unsupported by cogent material; and the two shops were stated to be subject to a family settlement and not under the Respondents’ effective control.

The High Court found that these conclusions were reasoned and supported by the record.

The Petitioner’s arguments essentially sought a re-evaluation of evidence and substitution of the ARC’s findings, which was impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8).

It held that the Respondents had established a landlord–tenant relationship, a bona fide requirement for the premises as a law office, and the absence of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

The ARC’s dismissal of the leave-to-defend application did not suffer from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, manifest illegality, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the impugned eviction order dated 7 April 2026 was upheld.

The pending applications were also disposed of.