Section 25-B(8) revision cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute the ARC’s factual findings.

The Petitioner challenged the order dated 21 April 2026 passed by the CCJ-cum-ARC, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”). The learned ARC rejected the Petitioner’s application for leave to defend and passed an eviction order in favour of the Respondent.

The Petitioner confined his challenge to the alleged absence of a landlord–tenant relationship. He claimed ownership of the shop measuring approximately 12 feet × 14 feet on the ground floor of property No. 111-D, Kamla Nagar, Delhi, by adverse possession, and denied that the Respondent was his landlord.

The Respondent relied upon a registered sale deed dated 7 December 2003, by which she claimed to have acquired a 1/6th share in the property, and orders passed in a partition suit recognising the relevant co-owners’ shares. She also relied upon a counterfoil of a rent receipt dated 18 November 2006 bearing the name of the Petitioner’s father as tenant.

The ARC held that the Respondent had shown a title superior to that of the Petitioner and that the landlord–tenant relationship was established.

The Court applied the limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, holding that such jurisdiction is not appellate and permits interference only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an unreasonable conclusion, or an error apparent on the face of the record; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

This principle was drawn from Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285.

For eviction under Section 14(1)(e), “ownership” requires the landlord to establish a title superior to that of the tenant rather than absolute title under the Transfer of Property Act, as recognised in Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha, (1987) 4 SCC 193, and Rajender Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati, 155 (2008) DLT 383.

A plea of adverse possession requires proof of continuous, open and hostile possession, including the date, nature, duration, and knowledge of the true owner; electricity bills and property-tax receipts do not constitute title documents.

A co-owner may maintain an eviction petition independently, as held in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, (2004) 3 SCC 178, and related Delhi High Court decisions.

The High Court held that the Petitioner’s plea of adverse possession was merely a bald assertion because he did not identify the date on which possession allegedly became hostile, the person against whom adverse possession was claimed, or the circumstances establishing the true owner’s knowledge.

Against this unsupported plea, the Respondent produced a registered sale deed evidencing her 1/6th co-ownership, orders in the partition proceedings recognising the relevant title, and a rent receipt showing the Petitioner’s father as tenant; the Petitioner had not specifically disputed the signatures or authenticity of the receipt.

These materials were sufficient to establish, at the leave-to-defend stage, a title superior to that asserted by the Petitioner and a landlord–tenant relationship.

The electricity bill and property-tax receipts relied upon by the Petitioner could not displace the registered title documents or establish ownership.

Since the ARC had considered the material contentions and reached a legally permissible conclusion, the revision would have required impermissible re-appreciation of evidence, which fell outside the scope of Section 25-B(8) revision.

The revision petition was dismissed, and the pending applications were also disposed of accordingly.