Section 25-B(8) revision cannot reappreciate facts absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity.

The Petitioner-tenant challenged, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Additional Rent Controller’s order dated 30 March 2026 dismissing his application for leave to defend and passing an eviction order concerning a ground-floor shop at 988–989, Ward No. XIV, Pan Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi.

The Petitioner alleged that the landlord had concealed other available premises, including shops on the ground floor, a shop under the staircase, vacant first- and second-floor premises, property in Narela Industrial Area, and property bearing No. 1310, Pan Mandi.

The ARC held that these assertions lacked particulars and supporting material demonstrating ownership, actual availability, or reasonable suitability as alternative accommodation.

The Petitioner further contended that the landlord had failed to specifically controvert these allegations and that the ARC had improperly advanced a case not pleaded by the landlord.

Whether the Petitioner’s allegations regarding concealed properties and alternative accommodation raised a triable issue warranting leave to defend under Section 25-B(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958?

Whether the ARC’s rejection of the leave-to-defend application suffered from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8)?

Whether premises on upper floors or other allegedly available properties could be treated as reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for the landlord’s ground-floor commercial requirement?

The Court applied Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, holding that the High Court’s jurisdiction is supervisory and revisional, not appellate; interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, the Court held that the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of the Rent Controller.

In relation to alternative accommodation under Section 14(1)(e), the Court relied on Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta and M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma for the rule that the alternative premises must be actually available and reasonably suitable in comparison with the premises sought to be recovered.

A tenant must raise a genuine triable issue supported by material particulars, rather than rely on bald assertions.

The Court also applied Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari, under which a tenant cannot compel a landlord to shift a commercial activity from a ground-floor shop to an upper floor where the ground floor is more commercially suitable.

The Court found that the ARC had considered the Petitioner’s allegations of concealment and alternative accommodation.

The assertions concerning the staircase shop, first- and second-floor premises, the Narela property, and property No. 1310 did not establish, even prima facie, that the properties were actually available to the landlord or reasonably suitable for the pleaded commercial requirement.

The allegations also lacked sufficient particulars and supporting material to constitute triable issues.

The Court held that the mere existence of premises on upper floors could not defeat the landlord’s claim because a ground-floor shop may offer materially greater commercial access and suitability; the tenant could not dictate the premises from which the landlord should conduct business.

Applying the restricted revisional standard under Section 25-B(8), the Court concluded that the ARC had applied the correct legal test and that its findings were neither perverse nor legally unsustainable.

No jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record was established in the ARC’s order.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the pending applications were disposed of.