Section 25-B(8) revision cannot substitute the Rent Controller’s factual findings on bona fide requirement.

The Respondents-landlords filed an eviction petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”) concerning part of property No. 4520, Ward No. VII, Lambi Gali, Ajmeri Gate, Delhi.

The Additional Rent Controller (“ARC”) allowed the eviction petition by order dated 20 April 2026 in RC-ARC/108/2022.

The Petitioner-tenant challenged the order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, contending that there was no landlord-tenant relationship because he had not attorned to the Respondents and had disputed their title under the Sale Deed dated 3 March 1997.

He also alleged that the Respondents possessed alternative properties at Mustafabad, Gali Sakkon Wali, Chauhan Bangar and Murari Road, Jamia Nagar, which could satisfy their bona fide requirement.

The ARC rejected both objections after examining the Petitioner’s admission that he had been inducted as a tenant by the erstwhile owner, Sh. Shamsuddin, and considering each alleged alternative property individually.

Whether the Respondents established a landlord-tenant relationship with the Petitioner despite the Petitioner’s denial of attornment and challenge to the Respondents’ title under the Sale Deed dated 3 March 1997.

Whether the properties relied upon by the Petitioner constituted alternative suitable accommodation disentitling the Respondents from eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

Whether the ARC’s order disclosed a jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality, material irregularity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

The proviso to Section 25-B(8) confers limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction; interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an unreasonable conclusion, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 78, Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , (2022) 6 SCC 30, Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover , 2025:DHC:11285, the Court held that the High Court cannot substitute its view for that of the ARC merely because another view is possible.

Under the principles stated in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman , (2002) 6 SCC 1, Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishwanath Bhikaji Mogul , (1997) 5 SCC 329, and Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan , (1988) 3 SCC 63, a transferee of the landlord’s interest automatically becomes the tenant’s landlord by operation of law and no express attornment is necessary.

Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 embodies the rule that a tenant cannot deny the title of the landlord under whom the tenancy commenced during its continuance.

For Section 14(1)(e), alternative accommodation must be both available and reasonably suitable, assessed with regard to its condition, location, accessibility, occupation and purpose; the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his bona fide requirements, subject to the choice not being fanciful, whimsical or mala fide.

The Court held that the Petitioner’s own admission that he entered the premises as a tenant under Shamsuddin and paid rent to him established the foundational tenancy.

Upon transfer of the landlord’s interest, the Respondents stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile landlord; therefore, the absence of express attornment and the Petitioner’s challenge to the Sale Deed did not create a triable issue or negate the landlord-tenant relationship.

Regarding alternative accommodation, the ARC had examined each property: the Mustafabad property was either dilapidated or occupied by tenants; the Gali Sakkon Wali property belonged to the Respondents’ brother; the Chauhan Bangar property stood in the names of the Respondents’ sons; and the Murari Road property was occupied by tenants.

These findings supported the conclusion that none of the properties was available and reasonably suitable for the Respondents’ pleaded requirement.

Since the Petitioner’s challenge essentially sought a fresh appreciation of the same evidence, and the ARC had considered the material objections and recorded reasoned findings, no permissible ground for revisional interference was established.

It held that the Respondents had established the landlord-tenant relationship despite the absence of express attornment and that no alternative suitable accommodation was shown to be available to them.

The ARC’s order was neither perverse nor legally infirm and disclosed no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or error apparent on the face of the record.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.