Section 25-B(8) revision is supervisory; reappreciation of evidence and substitution of views are impermissible.

The petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging the order dated 16 April 2026 passed by the learned CCJ-cum-ARC, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Eviction Petition No. 752/2019.

Before the High Court, the petitioner confined the challenge to the finding that the respondent-landlord did not possess reasonably suitable alternate accommodation.

The petitioner relied upon two rooms allegedly lying vacant on the second floor of property No. 336–337, Naya Katra, Chandni Chowk, and properties bearing Nos. B-72 and C-12, C.C. Colony, Delhi.

The learned ARC rejected these contentions, holding that the photographs did not establish the identity or vacancy of the alleged rooms, while no documentary material established the respondent’s ownership or availability of the C.C. Colony properties; further, those properties were admittedly let out to tenants.

1. Whether the alleged two vacant rooms on the second floor of property No. 336–337, Naya Katra, constituted reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available to the respondent-landlord and raised a triable issue.

2. Whether properties bearing Nos. B-72 and C-12, C.C. Colony, constituted reasonably suitable alternate accommodation, notwithstanding the respondent’s denial of ownership and the petitioner’s assertion that the properties were let out.

3. Whether the learned ARC’s findings on alternate accommodation disclosed a jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, material irregularity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Section 25-B(8).

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction rather than appellate jurisdiction.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that it cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of the Rent Controller unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or absence of adjudication.

The Court also relied on Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507, for the principle that alternate accommodation must be reasonably suitable and convenient in comparison with the tenanted premises.

The principles that the landlord is the best judge of the nature and manner of the required accommodation, and cannot ordinarily be compelled to use premises considered unsuitable or already let out, were drawn from Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353; Shiv Sarup Gupta; Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679; Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561; and Dharampal v. Chaudhary Ram Chander, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12980.

The High Court found that the learned ARC had separately and adequately considered each alleged alternative property.

As to the Naya Katra rooms, the photographs showed only doors and a window, without the property number or any identifying feature, and therefore did not establish either that they belonged to the relevant property or that they were vacant and available.

As to the C.C. Colony properties, the respondent had specifically denied ownership, while the petitioner produced no documentary evidence proving ownership or availability; in any event, the petitioner’s own case was that the properties were already let out, which prevented them from being treated as available alternate accommodation.

Since the ARC’s conclusions were reasoned and consistent with the limited scope of Section 25-B(8) revision, the High Court held that no permissible ground for revisional interference was made out.

It held that the alleged Naya Katra rooms were not proved to be identifiable vacant premises, and that the C.C. Colony properties were neither proved to belong to the respondent nor shown to be available, particularly as they were stated to be let out.

The ARC’s order did not suffer from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, material irregularity, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Accordingly, the revision petition and all pending applications, including the applications for stay and exemption, were dismissed.