Section 25 Hindu Succession Act disqualification applies only to the murdered person’s estate.

The Appellants (Plaintiffs), who are the son and step-son of the Respondent (Defendant), filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding a residential property.

They claimed that Plaintiff No. 1 is the exclusive owner of the property following an oral partition conducted by their late father during his lifetime.

The Appellants sought a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC to restrain the Respondent from entering the property, arguing she was disqualified from inheritance under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act due to her conviction for murdering her daughter-in-law.

The Respondent contested the suit, denying the partition, asserting her 1/3 share as a legal heir, and filing a counterclaim for possession.

The Trial Court (1st District Judge, Bemetara) dismissed the injunction application on 03.05.2025, holding that the Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case.

1. Whether a person convicted of murder is disqualified under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, from inheriting the property of someone other than the victim.

2. Whether the Appellants established a prima facie case and balance of convenience for a temporary injunction based on mutation entries and an alleged oral partition.

3. Whether a co-sharer is legally entitled to seek an injunction against another co-sharer in respect of joint property.

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC, which mandates that a temporary injunction requires the fulfillment of a three-pronged test: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which disqualifies a murderer from inheriting the property of the person they murdered.

Legal principle that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer title or prove exclusive ownership.

Settled rule that an injunction cannot be granted against a co-sharer; the appropriate remedy for a disgruntled co-sharer is a suit for partition.

The Court rejected the Appellants' argument regarding Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, clarifying that the statutory disqualification applies strictly to the property of the murdered person; because the Respondent sought inheritance from her deceased husband (not the daughter-in-law she killed), she remained a legal heir.

On the issue of ownership, the Court found that the Appellants failed to produce any documentary evidence—such as a partition deed or title transfer—to substantiate the claim that Plaintiff No. 1 was the sole owner.

It noted that mere mutation entries are insufficient to prove title.

Since the Respondent is a legal representative of her deceased husband, she is prima facie a co-sharer.

The Court reasoned that as a co-sharer cannot be injuncted by another co-sharer, and since no exclusive title was proven, the Appellants failed to meet the requirements for a temporary injunction.

The Court held that the Respondent is not disqualified from inheriting her husband’s property under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act despite her criminal conviction.

The Court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favor the Appellants and no irreparable loss would occur, as the proper remedy in disputes between co-sharers is a suit for partition, not an injunction.