Section 25B(8) revision cannot substitute appellate review absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity.

The petitioners-tenants filed a rent-control revision under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging the eviction order dated 5 February 2026 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, in Ahmad Hasan v. Mohd. Iliyas & Others, RC ARC No. 468/2023.

The respondent-landlord sought eviction on the ground of bona fide residential requirement, stating that he was elderly, suffered from health ailments, had strained relations with his sons’ families with whom he presently resided, and wished to shift to the tenanted premises with his daughter so that she could care for him.

The petitioners contended that the respondent was already occupying substantially larger premises, that his daughter had independent accommodation, and that suitable alternative accommodation was available to the respondent, including properties allegedly shown as sold in the eviction order.

The learned ARC declined leave to defend and passed the eviction order.

Before the High Court, the petitioners confined their challenge to bona fide requirement, alternative accommodation, and the alleged erroneous shifting of the burden of proof.

Whether the respondent’s asserted requirement to shift from larger existing premises to the comparatively smaller tenanted premises and reside there with his daughter constituted a bona fide requirement, or raised a triable issue warranting leave to defend?

Whether the alleged availability of independent accommodation to the respondent’s daughter and other properties attributed to the respondent constituted suitable alternative accommodation and raised a triable issue?

Whether the learned ARC committed a jurisdictional error by improperly shifting the burden of proof onto the petitioners?

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Under Section 14(1)(e), once the landlord establishes a prima facie case of bona fide requirement, the requirement is presumed genuine and the tenant must disclose material facts capable of disentitling the landlord from eviction.

Dependency for purposes of residential accommodation is not confined to financial dependency; a landlord may seek eviction to accommodate a family member having a close relationship or identity nexus with the landlord.

The landlord is ordinarily the best judge of the nature, extent and manner of his residential requirement, and neither the tenant nor the Court may dictate the landlord’s residential choice.

Under the proviso to Section 25B(8), the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction; interference is justified only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

A triable issue must be real, substantial, and supported by material which, if proved, would disentitle the landlord from eviction; speculative or bald assertions are insufficient.

The High Court held that the respondent’s age, health concerns, strained relations with his sons’ families, and stated desire to live with his daughter for care and assistance sufficiently established a prima facie bona fide requirement.

The fact that the respondent presently occupied larger premises did not create a triable issue, since the landlord’s choice to reside in a smaller premises with his daughter could not be judged from the tenant’s perception of comparative spaciousness.

No medical emergency was required as a precondition for asserting a bona fide residential need.

The daughter’s employment or financial independence was also immaterial because the asserted requirement was residential and the respondent himself sought to occupy the premises with her.

The petitioners produced no cogent material establishing that the daughter or her husband owned the accommodation in which she presently resided; the mere assertion that she had independent accommodation was therefore insufficient.

Similarly, the contention that the dates of sale of certain properties required further verification was speculative and unsupported by material showing that any suitable alternative accommodation was actually available to the respondent at the relevant time.

The ARC had considered the material objections and had not improperly shifted the burden; it had merely found that the petitioners’ unsupported assertions failed to displace the respondent’s prima facie case.

Since the petition essentially sought a reappreciation of evidence, no interference was permissible in the limited revision jurisdiction under Section 25B(8).

It held that the respondent’s requirement was bona fide, that the objections regarding the size of the premises, the daughter’s alleged independent accommodation, and alternative properties did not disclose any genuine triable issue, and that no jurisdictional error, perversity, material irregularity, or manifest illegality had been shown in the ARC’s order.

The revision petition and all pending applications were dismissed, and the next date of hearing, 5 October 2026, was cancelled.