Section 25B(8) revision cannot substitute the Rent Controller’s factual assessment absent jurisdictional error.

The Petitioners challenged, under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the judgment dated 17 February 2026 by which the learned Additional Rent Controller dismissed their eviction petition, Eviction Petition No. 5596/2016, titled Poonam Singh v. Mahendri & Ors.

The Petitioners contended that the learned ARC had wrongly held that they failed to establish ownership and the landlord–tenant relationship because relevant title documents had not been considered.

The ARC found ambiguity in the alleged rent/security agreement dated 17 March 2012 (Ex. PW-1/2), absence of proof of payment of rent, inconsistencies in the testimony of PW-1, and unexplained circumstances concerning the alleged transfer of ownership rights to the Petitioners.

It consequently held that the Respondents had raised a bona fide dispute regarding the Petitioners’ title and that the landlord–tenant relationship had not been proved.

1. Whether the learned ARC erred in holding that the Petitioners failed to establish the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship with the Respondents by allegedly disregarding material title documents.

2. Whether the findings of the learned ARC disclosed a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or non-consideration of material evidence warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

3. Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8), could reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion for that of the ARC merely because another view was possible.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, under which the High Court exercises supervisory and revisional—not appellate—jurisdiction over the ARC’s decision-making process.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is confined to cases involving an error apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or absence of adjudication; the High Court cannot conduct a roving inquiry or substitute its view for that of the ARC.

The same principle was reiterated with reference to Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285.

The Court also accepted the principle that existence of a landlord–tenant relationship is foundational to an eviction proceeding, and that a bona fide dispute regarding title may prevent the Rent Controller from finally adjudicating title.

The Court held that the ARC had not dismissed the eviction petition merely for want of title documents.

It had considered the alleged rent/security agreement, the oral testimony of PW-1, the documentary record, the absence of proof of rent payments, the inconsistencies in cross-examination, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged transfer of rights.

On that material, the ARC reasonably concluded that the Petitioners had failed to prove the foundational landlord–tenant relationship and that the Respondents had raised a bona fide cloud over the Petitioners’ title.

The High Court found that the ARC had consciously refrained from finally determining title, which was consistent with the limited jurisdiction of the Rent Controller.

The Petitioners’ challenge effectively sought a fresh appreciation of the evidence and a different inference from the same material, an exercise impermissible in revision under Section 25B(8).

No jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, material irregularity, or non-consideration of material evidence was established.

It held that the ARC’s findings were based on a proper consideration of the pleadings and evidence and that the decision-making process disclosed no legally cognisable infirmity warranting revisional interference.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the pending application(s) were disposed of.