Section 304B presumption cannot arise without proof of dowry cruelty soon before death.

The appellant married Tabassum on 15 September 2004, and they had two sons. Tabassum died on 3 December 2008, within four years of the marriage, at the matrimonial home in Ambad, Azad Nagar.

Her father, PW-1, alleged that he had paid ₹10,000, gold ornaments and household articles at the marriage and that the appellant subsequently subjected Tabassum to cruelty and demanded further sums of ₹1,000, ₹2,000 and finally ₹2,000 shortly before her death.

The inquest reports and post-mortem examination found no injuries apart from a ligature mark. The post-mortem doctor opined that death resulted from asphyxia of suicidal nature.

The appellant was charged under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code and was convicted by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Asansol, receiving three months’ imprisonment under Section 498A and life imprisonment under Section 304B.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand, thereby attracting Section 498A IPC?

2. Whether the prosecution established the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B IPC, particularly that the deceased was subjected to dowry-related cruelty or harassment “soon before her death”?

3. Whether the medical and other circumstantial evidence established that the appellant caused or was responsible for the deceased’s death?

The Court applied Sections 498A and 304B IPC, along with Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 304B requires proof that a woman died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and that, soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand; only upon proof of these foundational facts does the presumption under Section 113B arise.

The Court relied on Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259, for the principle that a material and unexplained inconsistency between ocular and medical evidence may constitute a fundamental defect in the prosecution case.

It also relied on M. Srinivasulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 12 SCC 443, which holds that “soon before” is a relative expression but requires evidence of proximate cruelty or harassment and that the prosecution must first establish the statutory foundational facts before the presumption operates.

In a circumstantial-evidence case, the “last seen” circumstance is only one link in the chain and cannot by itself establish guilt.

The allegations of payment of dowry were unsupported by documentary or reliable corroborative evidence; the Nikahnama did not record the alleged payment, no bank or postal records were produced, and the testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 was inconsistent and generalised.

The deceased and the appellant had frequently stayed at PW-1’s house, and the evidence showed that the deceased was unhappy primarily because of the appellant’s poverty and inadequate earnings, rather than establishing legally cognisable dowry harassment.

The witnesses also failed to provide consistent dates or details of the alleged demands, while several witnesses had not disclosed the material allegations to the Investigating Officer.

The medical evidence disclosed no bodily injuries or signs of physical struggle, and the post-mortem doctor described the death as suicidal asphyxia. No ligature or other incriminating article was recovered, and the circumstances of the asphyxiation remained unexplained.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence was inconsistent with the medical evidence and that the mere circumstance that the appellant was allegedly present in the house did not establish that he strangled the deceased or intended to cause her death.

Since the prosecution did not prove proximate dowry-related cruelty, the statutory presumption under Section 113B could not be invoked.

The conviction and sentences dated 20 and 21 June 2012 were set aside, and CRA 410 of 2012 was allowed.

CRAN 3 of 2026 and connected applications were disposed of accordingly; the appellant’s bail bond was discharged, subject to his executing a bond under Section 481 of the BNSS for six months.