Section 306 IPC requires clear, proximate instigation; a mere altercation cannot establish abetment of suicide.

The prosecution alleged that the respondent frequently visited the house of Ashaben, in the absence of her husband, and harassed her despite being warned not to do so.

On 3 February 2004, an altercation allegedly took place between the respondent and Ashaben, during which he slapped her.

Ashaben thereafter poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire; she subsequently died during treatment.

The respondent was prosecuted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The prosecution examined nine witnesses and produced fifteen documentary exhibits, including a dying declaration.

The Trial Court acquitted the respondent in Sessions Case No. 44 of 2010 by judgment dated 19 April 2012.

The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondent of the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC

Whether the prosecution evidence, including the dying declaration, established beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had abetted or instigated Ashaben to commit suicide

Whether the Trial Court’s appreciation of evidence and order of acquittal suffered from illegality, irregularity, or perversity warranting appellate interference

The Court applied Section 306 IPC, which punishes a person who abets the commission of suicide.

Relying on Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 1 SCC 750, it held that conviction under Section 306 IPC requires proof of a clear, proximate, and intentional act of instigation or abetment that led to the suicide.

Regarding the dying declaration, the Court relied on Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 4129, observing that a dying declaration may support conviction only when it is voluntary, truthful, reliable, consistently recorded, and free from suspicion or tutoring.

On appellate review of acquittal, the Court applied Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

These authorities recognise the appellate court’s power to reappreciate evidence but require due regard to the accused’s double presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, an acquittal should not ordinarily be disturbed.

The Court found that the prosecution witnesses, including the deceased’s husband and son, did not materially support the prosecution case; the husband was declared hostile, and the evidence of the son did not establish any act of instigation or abetment.

Although the prosecution relied on the dying declaration, the Court held that it did not reliably identify any specific act or omission by the respondent that legally amounted to incitement or abetment of suicide.

The alleged quarrel and slapping, even if accepted, were not shown through credible evidence to constitute the proximate intentional conduct required under Section 306 IPC.

Since the prosecution failed to prove the essential element of abetment beyond reasonable doubt, and the Trial Court’s view was a reasonable one based on the evidence, no perversity or manifest illegality justified appellate interference.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had abetted Ashaben’s suicide and that the Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence.

Finding no illegality, irregularity, or perversity in the acquittal, the Court dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the Trial Court’s judgment dated 19 April 2012.

The respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the Trial Court.