Section 311 CrPC cannot be invoked to recall child witnesses for filling lacunae after inordinate delay.

The petitioner, an Accountancy teacher, was charged under Sections 354/354A/354B of the IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act following complaints by five female students alleging inappropriate sexual conduct, touching, and threats

Charges were framed in 2016, and the victims (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-4) were examined and cross-examined between 2017 and 2018

In 2023, nearly six years later, the petitioner moved an application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. to recall PW-1, PW-2, and PW-4 for further cross-examination

He contended that their initial statements to the School Principal were not exhibited or used to confront them during the trial

The Trial Court dismissed the request to recall the victims, leading to this revision petition

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to recall child victims for further cross-examination under Section 311 Cr.P.C. after an inordinate delay

2. Whether the mandate of Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act restricts the court’s discretion to recall child witnesses to prevent repeated harassment

The court applied Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., which grants discretionary power to recall witnesses if their evidence is essential to a just decision, provided it is exercised judiciously and not to fill lacunae

Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act, which mandates that the Special Court ensure a child is not called repeatedly to testify

The court relied on Madhab Chandra Pradhan v. State of Odisha, holding that Section 33(5) is not an absolute bar but requires context-specific application

Rakesh v. State of NCT of Delhi, emphasizing that the right to a fair trial includes the victim's right not to be unnecessarily harassed

The court reasoned that while Section 311 powers are broad, they must be exercised with caution in POCSO cases to prevent re-traumatization of victims

Regarding PW-4, the court found no statement was ever recorded by the Principal, rendering the petitioner's ground factual baseless

For PW-1 and PW-2, the court noted that the statements in question were part of the chargesheet from the inception; therefore, the petitioner had full access and "adequate and fair opportunity" to use them during the original cross-examinations in 2017

The court observed that the six-year delay in filing the application suggested an attempt to delay the trial rather than a bona fide pursuit of justice

The court found the allegations in the FIR and the statements to the Principal were "broadly consistent," meaning the lack of confrontation did not result in a miscarriage of justice

The court concluded that the rights of the accused must be balanced with the statutory protection of child witnesses under Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act to avoid subjecting them to repeated trauma and dismissed the petition, upholding the Trial Court's order