Section 4 probation granted for Section 325 IPC conviction after 25 years of crime-free, settled life.

The appellants were prosecuted for assaulting Bhima Naik (P.W.3) in his hut during the night of 3 March 1997, allegedly following a quarrel concerning the taking of tari.

The prosecution alleged that appellant No. 1 assaulted the injured with a lathi and appellant No. 2 assaulted him with a knife.

Bhima Naik sustained multiple injuries, including fractures of the left radius and ulna and fractures of the seventh, eighth and ninth ribs.

His wife, Labanya Naik (P.W.2), claimed to have witnessed the assault, while the injured himself turned hostile and stated that he could not identify the assailants.

The trial court convicted both appellants under Sections 325 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each to three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/34 IPC and one year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 325/34 IPC.

They were acquitted of the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and that acquittal was not challenged by the State.

In appeal, the appellants ultimately confined their challenge to the sentence and sought the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, citing the passage of more than twenty-five years, absence of criminal antecedents and their settled lives.

Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants possessed the requisite intention or knowledge to attract liability under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC?

Whether the evidence sufficiently established the appellants’ common-intention liability for voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC?

Whether, despite upholding the conviction under Section 325/34 IPC, the appellants should be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958?

The Court applied Sections 307 and 325 read with Section 34 IPC: Section 307 requires proof of an act done with the intention or knowledge necessary to constitute culpable homicide of the specified kind, while Section 325 concerns voluntarily causing grievous hurt and Section 34 attributes liability for acts done in furtherance of common intention.

The Court relied on the principle that the prosecution must establish the requisite intention or knowledge for an offence under Section 307 beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 permits release on probation where the offender has committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Relying on Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 INSC 540, the Court held that the sentencing court has a statutory duty to consider probation where the provision is applicable; if probation is refused, special reasons must be recorded, consistently with Section 361 Cr.P.C.

The Court also referred to Pathani Parida v. Abhaya Kumar Jagdevmohapatra, 2012 (Supp-II) OLR 469, and Dhani @ Dhaneswar Sahu v. State of Orissa, 2007 (Supp-II) OLR 250, in support of granting probation in appropriate circumstances.

The Court found that the occurrence and the fact that Bhima Naik sustained serious injuries were established, particularly through the injured witness’s account and the medical evidence.

However, the injured could not identify the assailants, the alleged knife was never recovered, and P.W.2’s assertion that appellant No. 2 used a knife was materially weakened by her omission to state that fact to the police.

The Investigating Officer also confirmed several material omissions concerning the weapon, the identity of appellant No. 1 and the manner of assault.

In the absence of reliable evidence regarding the weapon and precise manner of assault, the Court held that the prosecution had not proved the specific intention or knowledge necessary for Section 307 IPC and therefore extended the benefit of doubt on that charge.

Conversely, the medical evidence established nine injuries, including grievous fractures of the forearm and ribs, which supported the conviction for voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325/34 IPC.

On sentencing, the Court considered the appellants’ age at the time of the occurrence, their present age in the mid-fifties, the pendency of the appeal for over twenty-five years, their lack of criminal antecedents, and their settled and law-abiding lives.

Applying Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and the principle in Chellammal, the Court concluded that incarceration after such a prolonged lapse would not serve a meaningful penological purpose.

The appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 307 IPC because the requisite intention or knowledge was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Their conviction under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC was upheld on the basis of the established grievous injuries and the prosecution evidence.

Instead of requiring them to undergo imprisonment, the Court extended the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and directed their release on probation for one year upon execution of bonds of ₹5,000 each with one surety for the like amount.

They were required to maintain peace and good behaviour, appear and receive sentence if called upon during the probationary period, and remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer.