Section 498A applies to live-in relationships akin to marriage if intent to marry is shown, Supreme Court rules

The appellant and Respondent No. 2 claimed to have married according to Hindu rites on 17 October 2010 and thereafter lived in Bengaluru.

Matrimonial disputes arose in 2016, resulting in two criminal complaints.

Charge-sheets were filed invoking Section 498A IPC, along with Sections 504, 506, 307, 494 and 149 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in one of the cases.

The appellant contended that no valid marriage existed, particularly because he had a prior marriage, and therefore Section 498A IPC—which refers to a “husband” or his “relative”—was inapplicable.

Respondent No. 2 alleged that the appellant had suppressed his prior marriage, represented himself as her husband, and subjected her to dowry-related harassment and physical cruelty.

The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, holding that “husband” under Section 498A could include a person in a void or voidable marriage and a live-in relationship having the attributes of marriage.

The appellant approached the Supreme Court against that order.

1. Whether Section 498A IPC applies to a man in a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage,” notwithstanding the absence of a legally valid marriage?

2. Whether the expression “husband” in Section 498A IPC should be given a strict, legally technical meaning or a purposive interpretation consistent with the provision’s protective and reformative object?

3. Whether the proceedings against the appellant disclosed a prima facie case warranting interference and quashing under Section 482 CrPC?

Section 498A IPC criminalises cruelty by a “husband” or his “relative” against a woman; cruelty means either wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to her physical or mental health, or harassment to coerce unlawful demands for property or valuable security.

Although penal statutes require strict construction, strict interpretation does not mean narrow or pedantic literalism that defeats legislative intent or creates loopholes.

Applying the purposive and mischief rules, particularly Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court held that “husband” may include a person who enters into a marital arrangement and, under the colour of that status, subjects the woman to cruelty.

A “relationship in the nature of marriage,” as explained in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, requires relevant indicators such as shared household, significant duration, holding out as spouses, pooling of resources, domestic arrangements, an intimate relationship, children where applicable, socialisation as spouses, and the parties’ intention and conduct.

For Section 498A, however, the relationship must additionally involve an established intent to marry; the initial burden of proving that intent lies on the woman invoking the penal protection.

The distinction between a legally married woman and a woman in such a relationship, for purposes of protection against domestic cruelty, lacks a rational nexus with the object of Section 498A and implicates Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

The safeguards against unnecessary arrest in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar apply strictly, including preliminary inquiry and compliance with Section 41 CrPC requirements.

The Court rejected a purely technical interpretation of “husband,” reasoning that the object of Section 498A is to deter and punish domestic cruelty and that such cruelty does not depend upon the formal performance or legal validity of a marriage.

It distinguished an ordinary live-in relationship from a relationship in the nature of marriage: not every live-in arrangement attracts Section 498A, and the protected relationship must involve marriage-like features as well as an intention to marry.

The Court also held that the remedies under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 do not make Section 498A unnecessary because the former is principally civil and provides protective, residence, monetary, custody and compensation remedies, whereas Section 498A supplies criminal deterrence.

On the facts, the allegations that the appellant suppressed his prior marriage, represented himself as Respondent No. 2’s husband, subjected her to dowry-related harassment and caused physical injury, if taken at face value, disclosed a cognizable offence.

Whether those allegations were ultimately true was a matter for trial and not for determination in a quashing proceeding.

The extended interpretation is confined to Section 498A IPC and does not automatically alter the meaning of “husband” under other provisions.

The Court directed that the safeguards in Arnesh Kumar must be strictly followed and that no arrest of the live-in partner or his relative should be made without the requisite preliminary inquiry and satisfaction of the statutory arrest requirements.

Since the allegations in the present case made out a prima facie cognizable offence, the Court declined to quash the proceedings; the trial court was permitted to proceed in accordance with law, without treating the Supreme Court’s observations as a determination on the merits.