Section 5 cannot condone delay in restoration applications under Order XXI Rule 106 CPC.

The petitioners, decree-holders in Regular Darkhast No. 10 of 2013, challenged the dismissal of the execution proceedings for default on 27 May 2024.

Instead of filing an application for restoration within the prescribed thirty-day period, they filed Special Civil Application No. 17586 of 2025 before the High Court on 04 December 2025.

That petition was withdrawn on 15 January 2026 with liberty to approach the Executing Court, and the period spent before the High Court was directed to be excluded while computing limitation.

The petitioners thereafter filed a restoration/review application on 23 January 2026 under Order XXI Rule 106 read with Order IX Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajula, rejected the delay application on 20 February 2026, relying on Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. v. Rajesh Steel Industries.

The petitioners challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is maintainable for condoning delay in filing an application for restoration under Order XXI Rule 106 of the CPC

Whether an application for restoration of an execution proceeding dismissed for default can be filed beyond thirty days prescribed under Order XXI Rule 106(3) of the CPC

Whether the period spent prosecuting the earlier writ petition could revive or extend the limitation period, when the restoration application was filed after expiry of the initial thirty-day period

Whether the Executing Court committed any jurisdictional or legal error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution

The Court applied Order XXI Rule 105(2) and Rule 106(3) of the CPC, under which an execution proceeding dismissed for default may be restored only through an application filed within thirty days from the date of the dismissal order.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 expressly excludes applications made under any provision of Order XXI of the CPC; consequently, delay in filing an Order XXI Rule 106 restoration application cannot be condoned under Section 5.

Relying on Damodaran Pillai v. South Indian Bank Ltd., 2005 AIR SC 3460, the Court held that the civil court cannot condone such delay by invoking inherent powers under Section 151 CPC when Section 5 is expressly excluded, and that the limitation period begins from the date of the dismissal order, not from the date of knowledge.

The Court also followed Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. v. Rajesh Steel Industries, (2014) 3 GLR 2454, which affirmed the non-maintainability of a delayed restoration application under Order XXI Rule 106.

The execution proceeding was dismissed on 27 May 2024, but the restoration application was filed only on 23 January 2026, well beyond the thirty-day period under Order XXI Rule 106(3).

Since Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications under Order XXI, the petitioners could not obtain condonation of delay either under Section 5 or through the court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC.

Although the High Court had excluded the period from 04 December 2025 to 15 January 2026 while permitting withdrawal of the earlier writ petition, that direction could not assist the petitioners because the writ petition itself had been filed long after the original thirty-day limitation period had expired.

The restoration application and the accompanying delay application were therefore legally non-maintainable, and the Executing Court committed no error in rejecting them.

The earlier writ proceedings did not revive the already-expired limitation period.

Finding no jurisdictional or legal error in the order dated 20 February 2026, the Court dismissed the petition in limine, made no order as to costs, and vacated any interim relief.