Section 7(3) Dowry Prohibition Act bars prosecuting aggrieved persons for giving dowry based on their own statements.

The petitioner (husband) and respondent No. 7 (wife) were involved in matrimonial litigation.

In 2023, the wife filed FIR No. 03 of 2023 under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act).

During the investigation, the wife and her family members made statements under Section 161 of the CrPC admitting to the payment of dowry.

Based solely on these statements, the petitioner sought the registration of a counter-FIR against the wife and her family for the offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP Act.

The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, rejected the petitioner’s application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, holding it amounted to a plea for reinvestigation.

This order was upheld by the Sessions Judge and subsequently by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, which concluded that the petitioner's allegations would entail an oblique reinvestigation of the original FIR.

The petitioner approached the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petition.

1. Whether statements made by a wife or her family members regarding the giving of dowry during an investigation can form the sole basis for prosecuting them for the offence of ‘giving dowry’ under Section 3 of the DP Act.

2. Whether the protection/immunity afforded under Section 7(3) of the DP Act extends to the parents and relatives of the bride.

3. Whether a second FIR can be registered for the offence of ‘giving dowry’ when the only evidence provided is the statement of the aggrieved person recorded in a prior investigation.

Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which penalizes both the giving and taking of dowry.

Section 7(3) of the DP Act, which stipulates that a statement made by a person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to prosecution under the Act.

Joint Parliamentary Committee Report (1982), which emphasized that givers of dowry are often victims of societal compulsion and should not be equated with takers.

Principles from Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, which allow for counter-complaints or rival versions under specific conditions.

The Court expressly disapproved of the Delhi High Court's reasoning in Neera Singh v. State, noting it was decided per incuriam for failing to consider Section 7(3).

The Court observed that the petitioner’s entire case for a counter-FIR rested exclusively on the statements made by the wife and her family under Section 161 CrPC.

It reasoned that Section 7(3) of the DP Act creates a "shield of immunity" for the "person aggrieved" to ensure they can come forward to report dowry demands without the fear of self-incrimination for the act of giving.

The Court clarified that while a second FIR is permissible if independent evidence of ‘giving’ dowry exists, it cannot be sustained when the substratum of the prosecution is merely the protected statements of the victims.

The Court affirmed the view that "person aggrieved" under Section 7(3) includes the parents and relatives of the bride, as they are typically the ones compelled to give dowry.

Consequently, since no independent evidence was offered by the petitioner, the statutory protection barred the initiation of criminal proceedings against the respondents.

The Court held that statements made by the wife and her family regarding the giving of dowry are protected under Section 7(3) of the DP Act and cannot be used to launch a prosecution against them for the offence of 'giving' dowry under Section 3.

The orders of the lower courts and the High Court refusing to direct the registration of a counter-FIR were upheld, albeit on the specific ground of statutory immunity under the DP Act.