Section 90 does not bar retrenchment notified before conciliation merely because termination takes effect during proceedings.

Hitachi Payment Services, which provided ATM-related services to Indusind Bank, engaged subcontractors to supply personnel, including caretakers.

After the Bank directed the removal of caretakers following the closure of 43 ATM sites, termination notices by way of retrenchment were issued on 26 May 2026, with termination effective from 30 June 2026.

A trade union issued a strike notice on 29 May 2026, and conciliation began with a meeting on 16 June 2026.

The Conciliation Officer subsequently recorded a status quo direction and, on 1 September 2026, treated the workers as continuing in service and advised release of their dues.

Hitachi and Indusind challenged the conciliation orders as beyond the Officer’s jurisdiction and contrary to the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

Whether the termination notices issued before the industrial dispute was raised, but effective during the conciliation proceedings, attracted the restrictions in Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

Whether the Conciliation Officer had authority to declare the workers deemed to remain in service and advise the employers to release their dues.

Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 restricts an employer from changing conditions of service in specified circumstances while an industrial dispute is pending; the Court considered its application in light of the date on which the termination process was initiated and the date conciliation commenced.

The Court also referred to Section 4 of the Industrial Disputes Act, describing a Conciliation Officer’s function as mediating in and promoting settlement of industrial disputes, and to Section 33 of that Act concerning unchanged conditions of service during pending proceedings.

The Court held that the Officer’s findings and directions exceeded the scope of the Officer’s conciliation role.

The Court treated 26 May 2026—the date the termination notices were issued—as the relevant date for assessing whether the retrenchment was initiated during a pending dispute.

Because the union’s strike notice and the first conciliation meeting followed that date, the Court found no prima facie violation of Section 90, notwithstanding that the stated termination date, 30 June 2026, fell during conciliation.

It further held that the Conciliation Officer exceeded the statutory role by treating the workers as deemed to remain in service and advising payment of dues on that basis.

It quashed and set aside the orders dated 29 June 2026 and 1 September 2026 and allowed both writ petitions, WPA 27330 of 2026 and WPA 27944 of 2026.