Section 91 CrPC does not entitle an accused to summon every document potentially useful to the defence.

The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, alleging that the petitioner issued a cheque for ₹3,00,000 towards repayment of a cash loan.

The petitioner disputed the loan and claimed that the cheque had been given as security in connection with earlier dealings.

During trial, the petitioner applied under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to summon the complainant’s money-lending licence, income-tax-related documents, and any writing concerning the alleged loan.

The Magistrate rejected the application, noting, among other things, the complainant’s position that he did not carry on a money-lending business and did not possess such a licence.

The Sessions Court dismissed the petitioner’s revision as barred by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., treating the Magistrate’s order as interlocutory.

The petitioner then invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.

1. Whether the documents sought by the petitioner were necessary or desirable to be summoned under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for the purposes of the trial.

2. Whether the courts below committed such illegality, perversity, or failure of justice as to warrant interference under Section 528 BNSS.

Section 91 Cr.P.C. empowers a court to require production of a document or thing when it considers production necessary or desirable for an inquiry or trial; it does not give an accused an unrestricted right to summon every document that might be useful to the defence, and the court must assess relevance and necessity.

Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. bars revision against interlocutory orders.

The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS is to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, not to substitute for appellate or revisional review merely because another view is possible.

The High Court held that the complainant’s stated lack of a money-lending licence meant that the court could not direct production of a document said not to exist in his possession merely because the petitioner asserted that it should exist.

The absence of a written loan document could be tested through evidence and did not, by itself, require a Section 91 summons.

The petitioner’s security-cheque defence remained available for determination on the evidence at trial, and the court declined to conduct a mini-trial on the alleged loan at the document-production stage.

Since the challenged order did not finally determine a substantive right or foreclose the petitioner’s defence, and the petitioner had not shown material prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, the conditions for inherent intervention were not met.

The petition under Section 528 BNSS was dismissed at the admission stage.

The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the document-production issue and should not influence the trial court’s determination of the Section 138 complaint on its merits.