Seniority alone confers no enforceable right to current charge of a higher post.

The petitioner, a Lecturer (LB), was assigned the administrative and financial charge of Block Education Officer (BEO), Odgi, by order dated 19 December 2025 and assumed charge on the same day.

By order dated 10 June 2026, respondent No. 6, another Lecturer (LB) allegedly junior to the petitioner, was appointed/transferred as In-charge BEO, Odgi, replacing the petitioner.

The petitioner challenged the order, contending that it violated the State instructions dated 4 August 2011 and 14 July 2014, under which a junior employee should not be assigned the current charge of a vacant higher post by superseding a senior.

The State argued that holding current charge did not confer any right to the higher post, that respondent No. 6 was qualified, and that complaints against the petitioner had led to the initiation of an enquiry by the Collector.

Whether the petitioner had a legal or enforceable right to continue as In-charge BEO merely because he was senior to respondent No. 6.

Whether the appointment of respondent No. 6 as In-charge BEO, despite the petitioner’s alleged seniority and prior assumption of charge, violated any statutory rule or binding government instruction and was therefore arbitrary or illegal.

Whether the pendency of an enquiry concerning the petitioner constituted a relevant circumstance for assessing his suitability to hold the current charge.

The Court applied the principle that seniority alone does not confer an indefeasible or enforceable right to hold the current charge of a higher post, particularly where the arrangement is temporary or stopgap.

Entrustment of current charge involves consideration of overall suitability, experience, administrative requirements, and other relevant circumstances; seniority is not an automatic substitute for suitability.

Judicial review under Article 226 is not warranted unless the administrative decision violates a statutory rule or binding instruction, or is arbitrary, perverse, or mala fide.

A pending enquiry is not a final finding of misconduct but may constitute a relevant circumstance in assessing an employee’s suitability for current charge.

The petitioner relied principally on his seniority, prior assumption of charge, and the government instructions of 2011 and 2014. However, he did not establish that any statutory provision or binding instruction created a right in favour of the senior employee to receive or retain the current charge of BEO.

The Court treated the charge of BEO as a stopgap administrative arrangement and accepted that the competent authority could select another duly qualified Lecturer based on suitability and administrative considerations.

The Collector’s communication recording serious observations and initiating an enquiry against the petitioner was not treated as proof of misconduct, but it was considered a relevant factor that the authority could take into account while assessing suitability.

Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate statutory violation, arbitrariness, perversity, or mala fides, and since the issue was materially identical to that decided in Kishun Lal Matawale, the Court declined to interfere under Article 226.

The appointment of respondent No. 6 was not shown to violate any statutory rule or binding instruction and did not warrant judicial interference.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed in terms of the order dated 11 August 2026 passed in Kishun Lal Matawale v. State of C.G., WPS No. 5810 of 2026.