Service at tenanted premises remains valid despite tenant’s absence; delayed knowledge does not extend limitation.

The respondents initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioner under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”).

The learned Additional Rent Controller (“ARC”) recorded that the petitioner had been duly served on 21 March 2025 and that his application for leave to defend, filed on 7 April 2025, was barred by limitation; the ARC consequently declined to take it on record.

In revision under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act read with Section 151 CPC, the petitioner contended that service was invalid because the summons, delivered at the tenanted premises to the wife of his younger brother, had not been personally received or immediately communicated to him.

He further disputed the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship between the parties.

Whether the petitioner was duly served with summons at the tenanted premises, so that the statutory period for filing an application for leave to defend commenced from 21 March 2025.

Whether the petitioner’s application for leave to defend, filed on 7 April 2025, was barred by limitation.

Whether, in a revision under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, the High Court could examine the petitioner’s challenge to the landlord–tenant relationship when the ARC had not adjudicated that issue.

The Court applied Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over the ARC’s decision-making process and does not act as an appellate court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

It also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, on the restricted scope of revision.

Under Shyam Sundar Wadhawan v. Vivek Arya, 2014 (214) DLT 616, service of summons is assessed on the facts of each case; receipt by a person other than the tenant does not automatically invalidate service, particularly where the tenant has knowledge of, consents to, or avoids service.

The Court held that the petitioner’s own case established his continuing connection with the tenanted premises: his belongings and documents remained there, he retained access to a room, and he visited the premises to collect them.

Therefore, service at that premises could not be invalidated merely because he was not personally present when the summons were received or because the recipient allegedly failed to inform him immediately.

The Court also noted that the petitioner’s assertion that he was residing elsewhere due to a family dispute was absent from his leave-to-defend application and affidavit, and appeared to be a subsequent narrative.

Since service was treated as effective from 21 March 2025, the application filed on 7 April 2025 was beyond the prescribed period, and the ARC’s limitation finding disclosed no revisional error.

The challenge to the landlord–tenant relationship could not be considered because the ARC had not adjudicated it and the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction did not permit examination of issues arising for the first time in revision.

It declined to examine the petitioner’s challenge to the landlord–tenant relationship, leaving that contention to be raised at the appropriate stage and before the appropriate forum, if legally permissible.

Finding no jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed the revision petition and disposed of the pending applications.