Set aside termination orders necessitate counting intervening periods as continuous service for eligibility and experience purposes.

The petitioner was appointed as an Anganwari Sevika on 11-07-2007. Her services were subsequently terminated, but that termination was set aside by the Patna High Court on 07-08-2017 in CWJC No. 19157 of 2010

In 2025, she applied for the post of "Lady Supervisor" under Advertisement No. 01/2025. Her application was rejected by the Child Development Project Officer (CDPO) on the grounds that she lacked the requisite 10 years of experience, as the period between 2009 and 2017 (during the litigation) was treated as a "break-in-service"

The petitioner filed a representation before the CDPO, which remained unresolved, leading to the present writ petition seeking a mandamus to treat her service as continuous

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat her service as continuous from 2007 to date for the purpose of seniority and experience eligibility

2. Whether the petitioner followed the appropriate administrative remedy before approaching the High Court under Article 226

The court relied on the legal principle that when a termination order is set aside by a competent court, the employee is generally entitled to continuity of service

the court referenced the Supreme Court precedent in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2002), which addresses the consequences of setting aside a termination order regarding service benefits

Procedurally, the court looked to Clause-11 of the recruitment advertisement, which identifies the District Magistrate as the competent authority for grievances related to service conditions

The petitioner argued that since her 2010 termination was legally quashed in 2017, the intervening period cannot be treated as a break-in-service for eligibility purposes

Under the terms of the advertisement (Clause-11), the District Magistrate, Sitamarhi, is the designated authority to adjudicate grievances, not the CDPO to whom the petitioner had submitted her representation

The Court found merit in the State's procedural objection, noting that a writ of mandamus is premature if the petitioner has not exhausted the specific alternative remedy provided in the recruitment guidelines

The District Magistrate was ordered to pass a "reasoned and speaking order" on the merits of her continuity of service within 60 days of receipt. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions