Setting aside termination extinguishes consequential allotment founded on the resulting vacancy.

Respondent No. 8 was providing Mid Day Meal services at Government High School, Rahi, District Shivpuri (Middle Section). Its contract was terminated on 22 December 2025.

Following the termination, an advertisement was issued on 7 January 2026, pursuant to which the petitioner was selected and awarded the Mid Day Meal contract on 3 February 2026.

Respondent No. 8 challenged its termination in Appeal No. 54/B-121/2025-26. The Additional Collector, Shivpuri, allowed the appeal on 16 June 2026, setting aside the termination on the ground that respondent No. 8 had not been afforded an opportunity of hearing.

The petitioner challenged that appellate order under Article 226, contending that its subsequent allotment created a vested legal right and that the appellate order could not invalidate its contract without first setting aside the allotment in its favour.

1. Whether the petitioner, as a subsequent allottee of the Mid Day Meal contract, had locus standi to challenge the order restoring respondent No. 8’s contract after its termination was set aside for violation of natural justice?

2. Whether the petitioner’s subsequent contract survived after the termination of respondent No. 8’s contract was set aside?

3. Whether the Additional Collector’s order dated 16 June 2026 setting aside respondent No. 8’s termination was illegal or perverse?

The Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It applied the principles of natural justice, holding that an adverse order terminating a contractual arrangement cannot stand where the affected party was not afforded an opportunity of hearing.

The Court further applied the doctrine that a consequential or derivative right cannot survive independently once the foundational order or circumstance giving rise to it ceases to exist.

Accordingly, where a subsequent allotment arose only because of the termination of an earlier contract, setting aside that termination removes the basis for the subsequent allotment and renders consequential proceedings otiose.

A subsequent allottee, who was neither a participant in the original selection process nor an earlier challenger to the original allotment, does not acquire locus to contest restoration of the original allottee’s contract merely by virtue of the later allotment.

The Court found that the petitioner’s allotment was made solely because a vacancy arose after respondent No. 8’s contract was terminated.

Since the termination was set aside on the ground of denial of hearing, the vacancy itself ceased to exist.

Consequently, the advertisement and the petitioner’s allotment, both being consequential to the termination, lost their legal foundation and could not confer an independent enforceable right upon the petitioner.

The Court also held that the petitioner had not participated in or challenged the original process through which respondent No. 8 obtained the contract; it entered the matter only as a subsequent allottee.

Its rights therefore remained subject to the validity of respondent No. 8’s termination and could not confer sufficient locus to challenge the order restoring respondent No. 8’s position.

The appellate order was accordingly not shown to be illegal or perverse.

Once respondent No. 8’s termination was set aside for breach of natural justice, the vacancy, advertisement, and subsequent allotment in favour of the petitioner lost their foundation.

The writ petition was therefore dismissed, and admission was declined.