Sole testimony of prosecutrix justifies rape conviction notwithstanding omissions in Section 164 CrPC statement.

The victim, a 22-year-old woman from Northeast India, was employed as a domestic help/cook for a Korean national in Gulmohar Park, Delhi.

On July 26, 2009, while her employer was abroad, the victim was sleeping on the terrace because her cooler was malfunctioning.

The Appellant, Madan Singh, who was employed by the building’s owner, allegedly forced himself upon her.

The victim resisted, causing nail scratches on the Appellant’s chest.

Following the incident, the victim contacted her employer, who directed her to notify the police, leading to the registration of FIR No. 205/2009.

During the investigation, a condom wrapper was recovered from the site, and the Appellant was arrested.

The Trial Court convicted the Appellant under Section 376 of the IPC, sentencing him to five years of Rigorous Imprisonment.

The Appellant challenged the conviction, primarily citing the victim’s silence regarding the rape in her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and the lack of semen traces in the FSL report.

1. Whether the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can form the basis of conviction when her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is silent on the allegation of rape.

2. Whether the absence of semen on the victim’s clothes or person and defects in the police investigation (such as failure to seize broken speakers) are fatal to the prosecution’s case.

3. Whether the Appellant’s plea of false implication due to a dispute over loud music and broken speakers was a plausible defense.

Section 376 of the IPC regarding the offense of rape.

Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, establishing that the quality, not quantity, of evidence is material.

The court invoked the principle that a conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is of "sterling quality".

The court cited State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, distinguishing between normal discrepancies and material contradictions.

The court followed C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. and Ganga Singh v. State of M.P., which held that investigative lapses do not justify acquittal if the remaining evidence is reliable.

The Court observed that the victim’s testimony was trustworthy and her initial silence in the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement was attributable to her vulnerability, trauma, and the social pressures inherent in a "tradition-bound non-permissive society".

It noted that the Section 164 statement is not substantive evidence but a tool for corroboration or contradiction, whereas the testimony given in court carries substantive weight.

The Court found significant corroboration in the medical evidence: the victim's MLC reported recent sexual activity.

The Appellant’s MLC confirmed four fresh scratch marks on his neck and chest, consistent with the victim's account of resistance.

The absence of semen was explained by the reported use of a condom.

The Court dismissed the Appellant’s defense of false implication over a music dispute as contradictory, noting he "blew hot and cold" by simultaneously claiming false implication and implied consent.

Investigative lapses, such as the failure to seize broken speakers, were deemed insufficient to dislodge the "substratum of the prosecution case".

It held that the victim was a truthful witness whose testimony was corroborated by medical findings and the presence of physical injuries on the Appellant.

The Court found the Appellant guilty under Section 376 IPC and directed him to surrender forthwith to undergo the remainder of his five-year sentence.