Specific performance requires proof of readiness and willingness, including availability of funds.

The applicant Society entered into an agreement of sale dated 20 August 2013 with the respondents and paid an advance of ₹20,00,000.

Disputes arose over performance of the agreement.

Before the arbitrator, the Society sought specific performance, damages or alternative relief.

The arbitrator rejected specific performance, finding that the Society had not established readiness and willingness, but directed refund of the advance with 18% interest from the agreement date until the award and future interest at 18% until payment.

The Society challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking specific performance.

Whether the arbitrator’s finding that the Society had not established readiness and willingness to perform the agreement justified denying specific performance.

Whether the award disclosed any infirmity or perversity warranting interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits a court to set aside an arbitral award only on the statutory grounds for interference; it does not provide a basis to reappreciate evidence merely to reach a different conclusion.

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as referred to in the judgment, requires a party seeking specific performance to establish performance, or continuous readiness and willingness to perform, its contractual obligations.

The arbitrator also relied on a Supreme Court decision concerning readiness and willingness, but the judgment does not identify that decision by name or citation.

The arbitrator found that the Society’s claim petition did not disclose the source or availability of funds to pay the balance consideration.

The High Court accepted that finding and held that the Society, despite being a multi-state co-operative society, remained subject to the readiness-and-willingness requirement under Section 16(c).

The respondents’ failure to perform their obligations did not, on the material before the court, cure the Society’s failure to establish its own readiness and willingness.

The court found no infirmity or perversity in the arbitrator’s reasoning that would justify Section 34 interference.

It dismissed the Section 34 petition, closed the connected application, and made no order as to costs.