Stamping compliance depends on actual execution, not a typographical date appearing in the instrument.

The petitioner, along with other purchasers, acquired immovable property situated at Village Variav, Surat, under a registered sale deed for a consideration of ₹2.65 crores.

The e-stamp certificate for ₹16,88,600 was purchased on 05.03.2011, and the sale deed was registered on 07.03.2011, the next working day.

However, the deed mentioned 03.03.2011 on its front page as the date of execution.

The petitioner contended that this was a typographical error and that the deed was actually executed upon purchase of the stamp on 05.03.2011 and registered on 07.03.2011.

The Deputy Collector initiated proceedings under Sections 33 and 39(1) of the Bombay Stamp Act, holding that the stamp was not purchased within the time prescribed by Section 17, and directed recovery of ₹16,88,600 with a penalty of ₹5,400.

The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority confirmed that decision on 02.03.2017.

The petitioner challenged both orders before the Gujarat High Court.

Whether the date of execution of the sale deed was 03.03.2011 merely because that date appeared on its front page, or whether the authorities were required to determine the actual date on which the instrument was signed and executed.

Whether purchase of the e-stamp on 05.03.2011 and registration of the sale deed on 07.03.2011 complied with Section 17 of the Bombay Stamp Act.

Whether the authorities were justified in recovering the stamp duty amount and imposing a penalty solely on the basis of the date mentioned in the document.

The Court applied Section 2(i) of the Bombay Stamp Act, under which “executed” and “execution,” in relation to instruments, mean “signed” and “signature”.

Section 17 requires an instrument chargeable with duty and executed in the State to be stamped before or at the time of execution, or immediately thereafter on the next working day following the day of execution.

The Court also considered the proceedings under Sections 33 and 39(1), concerning impounding of an insufficiently stamped instrument and recovery of duty and penalty.

The governing principle was that the date of execution is the date on which the instrument is actually signed, and not necessarily the date mechanically appearing on its first page.

The Court found that the authorities had treated 03.03.2011 as the execution date solely because it was printed on the front page of the sale deed.

No affidavit, statement, reply, or other material from any party to the transaction supported the conclusion that the deed had actually been signed on that date.

In contrast, the petitioner’s case was supported by the e-stamp purchased on 05.03.2011 and registration on 07.03.2011, which was the next working day.

Since execution under Section 2(i) means signing, the date printed on the document could not, without more, establish the actual date of execution.

The Court further observed that a sale transaction involves preparation and finalisation of the draft, corrections, payment, and eventual signing; therefore, the date on the front page is not determinative of execution.

As none of the parties disputed the petitioner’s version and the authorities produced no contrary evidence, the recovery and penalty were held to be unsupported by material evidence.

The purchase of the e-stamp on 05.03.2011 and registration on 07.03.2011 were accepted as consistent with the petitioner’s case that the instrument was executed within the period contemplated by Section 17.

The orders of the Deputy Collector and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority were quashed and set aside; the petition was allowed and Rule was made absolute.