State authorities cannot deny distributorship on eligibility criteria previously declared ultra vires.

The petitioners sought M.R. Distributorship licences for Joypur and Raghunathpur-II Blocks in the District of Purulia pursuant to vacancy notifications dated 16 January 2019.

This was the petitioners’ third round of litigation concerning the proposed distributorship. In an earlier proceeding, WPA 10846 of 2021, the Court directed the competent authority to consider and dispose of the petitioners’ application.

Pursuant thereto, the District Controller, Food and Supplies passed a reasoned order dated 9 May 2024 rejecting the petitioners’ candidature under Clause 7 of the vacancy notifications.

The authority found that the petitioner-company already held an M.R. Distributorship licence at Jamalpur, Purba Bardhaman, and therefore was disqualified under Clause 7, which prohibited an applicant from holding an existing FPS Dealership/Distributorship licence.

The petitioners challenged the rejection, contending that Clause 7 was identical to a clause previously declared ultra vires by the Court in WPA 2836 of 2021 and that the authority could not rely upon it again.

The State disputed the maintainability of the writ petition and argued that the petitioners, having applied under the notifications, were estopped from challenging Clause 7.

Whether the competent authority could reject the petitioners’ application by relying upon Clause 7 of the vacancy notifications dated 16 January 2019, when an identical clause had previously been declared ultra vires by the Court.

Whether the petitioners were estopped from challenging Clause 7 merely because they had applied for the distributorship pursuant to the relevant vacancy notifications.

Whether the petitioners were entitled to a direction for grant of the M.R. Distributorship licences, subject to their being otherwise eligible in law.

A declaration by a constitutional court that a clause in a vacancy notification is ultra vires is binding upon the concerned State authorities, which cannot subsequently rely upon the same or an identical clause to reject an applicant’s candidature.

The Court applied the principle that administrative authorities must act consistently with binding judicial orders and cannot revive or enforce a provision that has already been invalidated.

The Court also rejected the State’s reliance on the petitioners’ participation in the selection process as a bar to relief, since participation in a process does not authorise the State to enforce a clause that has been declared legally invalid.

No specific statutory provision or reported precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court observed that the petitioners had repeatedly approached the Court because the authority had declined their application on different grounds despite earlier directions to consider it.

The immediate rejection was based solely on the petitioners’ existing M.R. Distributorship licence and Clause 7 of the impugned notifications.

The Court found that Clause 7 was identical to the clause previously declared ultra vires in WPA 2836 of 2021, even though the earlier decision concerned a different location.

Consequently, the authority was bound by the earlier declaration and could not again invoke the same eligibility restriction.

The Court therefore held that the order dated 9 May 2024 was legally unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

It directed the competent authority to provide the petitioners with M.R. Distributorship licences for the concerned locations, provided that they were otherwise eligible under law, within eight weeks from communication of the judgment.

WPA 13834 of 2024, along with CAN 1 of 2024 and CAN 2 of 2024, was accordingly disposed of.