State must grant regular-pay-scale appointments equally to similarly situated compassionate appointees despite post-2006 recommendations.

The petitioners were dependants of deceased government teachers who had died before 1 July 2006, the date on which the Bihar Primary Teachers (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 came into force.

Their applications for compassionate appointment had also been made before that date; however, owing, inter alia, to governmental restrictions on such appointments, the District Compassionate Appointment Committees recommended their appointment to Class III posts only after 1 July 2006.

The petitioners were consequently appointed as Prakhand/Nagar Teachers on fixed pay under the 2006 Rules, despite the recommendations being for Class III posts.

They challenged the denial of regular appointment and regular pay through successive writ proceedings and related litigation.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mukesh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 5 SCC 383, and subsequent decisions in Rhituraj Saraubh and Chandra Shekhar Azad, they claimed parity with similarly situated dependants who had been granted appointment against regular posts with regular pay scales.

The State contended that, since the recommendations were made after 1 July 2006, the petitioners were governed by Rule 10 of the 2006 Rules and were entitled only to appointment on fixed pay.

1. Whether dependants of teachers who died before 1 July 2006, but whose compassionate-appointment recommendations were made after that date, could be considered for regular appointment or regular pay in light of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court in Mukesh and the State’s Memo No. 38 dated 12 January 2018.

2. Whether the State could deny the petitioners the benefit extended to similarly situated persons in Rhituraj Saraubh and Chandra Shekhar Azad on the ground that the Assistant Teacher cadre was a dying cadre or that the recommendations were made after 1 July 2006.

3. Whether the orders rejecting the petitioners’ claims were arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Rule 10 of the Bihar Primary Teachers (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006, under which compassionate appointments after 1 July 2006 were ordinarily to be made as Prakhand, Panchayat or Nagar Teachers on fixed pay.

It relied on Mukesh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 5 SCC 383, which held that persons recommended for regular Class III or Class IV appointment before 1 July 2006 were entitled to regular appointment or regular pay, while those appointed after that date were not automatically entitled to regular pay; nevertheless, the latter category was granted liberty to seek suitable relief from the State Government.

The Court further relied on Rajiv Ranvijay Kumar v. State of Bihar, the Division Bench decision in Rhituraj Saraubh v. State of Bihar, and Chandra Shekhar Azad v. State of Bihar, holding that Memo No. 38 dated 12 January 2018 constituted a conscious State policy to consider such cases and, where the deceased teacher had died before 1 July 2006 and the competent committee had recommended appointment against a regular post, to act upon that recommendation by granting regular appointment or regular pay.

The Court also applied the constitutional principles of equality and non-arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 16, including the rule that similarly situated persons must receive similar treatment, and the principle that the State must act as a model employer.

The Court distinguished the petitioners’ automatic entitlement under Mukesh from their entitlement to consideration under the liberty expressly granted in that judgment.

Although the recommendations in their cases were made after 1 July 2006, the deaths and the original applications preceded the 2006 Rules, and the State had subsequently adopted Memo No. 38 to address precisely this category of cases.

The Division Bench decisions in Rhituraj Saraubh and Chandra Shekhar Azad had treated the memo as binding upon the State and had upheld regular appointment or regular pay for similarly placed dependants whose recommendations were delayed but who were otherwise covered by the State’s policy.

The Court held that the State could not selectively extend the benefit to one group and deny it to the petitioners without establishing a rational distinction based on death dates, eligibility, recommendations or the applicable policy.

The administrative delay in making the recommendations was considered fortuitous and could not fairly prejudice the dependants.

The State’s reliance on the “dying cadre” argument was also rejected in view of Chandra Shekhar Azad, which recognised that the State had discretion, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s liberty, to grant relief in appropriate cases and could not subsequently withdraw or deny benefits already extended to similarly situated persons.

The rejection of their claims on the ground that their recommendations were made after 1 July 2006, or that they were dissimilar from the earlier beneficiaries, was arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory under Articles 14 and 16.

The impugned rejection orders were set aside.

The Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, and the Director, Primary Education, Bihar, were directed to reconsider the petitioners’ cases afresh by treating them at par with the similarly situated employees and to extend consequential benefits, including regular pay scale, preferably within three months from receipt or production of the judgment.

All three writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.