Status Quo Must Conform to Topographical Reality and Possession as Recorded by Commission Reports.

The petitioners (defendants) sold 50.5 decimals of land in plot no. 155/440 to the opposite party (plaintiff) via a registered deed dated 11.06.2002.

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, claiming a right of ingress and egress through a narrow strip of land called "Barampath" (ka-1 schedule), alleging it was the only path to the public road.

The Trial Court ordered status quo regarding the nature and possession of the property.

The Appellate Court modified this order, directing the defendants not to prevent the plaintiff from using the path for cultivation, effectively granting the plaintiff access.

The defendants challenged this, noting that the title deeds contained no recital of the pathway and that a Commissioner’s report showed the path was blocked by fencing at the western end.

1. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for the existence and usage of a pathway (easement of necessity or prescription) despite the absence of such a recital in the title deeds.

2. Whether the Appellate Court’s mandatory-style injunction was sustainable given the Commissioner's findings that the path was obstructed at the source.

Principles governing temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, emphasizing the triad of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The law of Easements, specifically "easement of necessity" and "easement by prescription" (requiring 20 years of uninterrupted use), noting that such rights are matters of evidence and cannot be determined solely on pleadings if the topography is disputed.

The primary objective of temporary injunctions: the protection and preservation of the property in its existing state (status quo).

The High Court found the Appellate Court’s order flawed because it ignored the actual topography recorded by the Court Commissioner.

The earliest Commissioner's report (dated 08.01.2021) explicitly stated that while the path existed on the defendants’ land, its western end was fenced off, making it "impossible to reach" the plaintiff’s land.

The High Court reasoned that since the plaintiff failed to prove possession or continuous usage of the path at the time the suit was filed—and the deeds were silent on the path's existence—the Appellate Court erred by granting a restraint order that essentially forced open a closed passage before trial.

The court noted that the question of whether the plaintiff was "landlocked" is a triable issue of fact that requires evidence and cannot be assumed at the interlocutory stage.

The parties were further restrained from creating third-party interests in the disputed path until the disposal of the suit, and the Trial Court was directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously.