Statutory appellate remedies under Section 18 of PoSH Act must be exhausted before seeking writ relief.

The Petitioner, an Assistant Professor (Dharmashastra) at the Respondent University since 23.08.2023, was allegedly assaulted by students on 29.08.2024 for failing them in examinations.

On 30.08.2024, four students filed a sexual harassment complaint against the Petitioner, which he claims was a retaliatory and motivated action.

An Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) conducted an inquiry and, on 13.01.2025, concluded that the allegations were proven.

Subsequently, the Executive Council dismissed the Petitioner from service on 26.08.2025 and barred him from future government employment.

The Petitioner challenged these orders via a writ petition, alleging violations of natural justice, specifically the denial of cross-examination and non-supply of authenticated documents.

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in light of the alternative statutory remedy of appeal provided under the PoSH Act.

2. Whether the Petitioner’s apprehension regarding the efficacy of the internal appellate authority justifies bypassing the statutory remedy.

Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ("PoSH Act"), which mandates that an aggrieved person may prefer an appeal against ICC recommendations within ninety days in accordance with applicable service rules.

The doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies as articulated in Vineet Saraf v. Rural Electrification Corpn. Ltd., which establishes that writ courts should not entertain matters where a statutorily established specialized forum exists, as doing so would obviate the will of Parliament.

The court examined whether the Petitioner should be permitted to bypass the statutory appeal mechanism. While the Petitioner argued that an appeal to the Vice Chancellor would not be an efficacious remedy, the court found no evidence on record to support this claim.

The court reasoned that since the PoSH Act is a specialized statute, the legislative intent to resolve such disputes through specific procedures and specialized forums must be respected.

By applying the principle from Vineet Saraf, the court held that it would be a "disservice to the Legislature" to grant reliefs that fall within the purview of a statutorily established alternate forum.

The court determined that the Petitioner must first exhaust the appellate remedy provided under Section 18 of the PoSH Act.

The Court held that the Petitioner is at liberty to file an appeal before the competent authority, which must decide the matter strictly on its merits after providing a fair hearing to all parties.

The writ petition was disposed of with all rights and contentions left open.