Statutory appellate remedy under POSH Act supersedes writ jurisdiction for challenging Internal Committee recommendations.

The appellant challenged the recommendations of the Internal Complaint Committee (ICC) of the respondent-employer dated 25.09.2025 regarding a complaint under the POSH Act, 2013

The appellant also sought a mandamus for the constitution of a fresh ICC as per an order by the State Human Rights Commission

A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 16.04.2026, relegating the appellant to the statutory remedy of appeal

The appellant challenged this dismissal via the present intra-court appeal, primarily contending that no such appellate forum exists under Section 18(1) of the Act

1. Whether an alternative statutory remedy of appeal exists for an employee aggrieved by the recommendations of an ICC when specific service rules are absent

2. Whether the Appellate Authority notified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, is competent to hear appeals under the POSH Act, 2013, without a fresh post-2013 notification

The Court applied Section 18(1) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), which mandates that where no service rules exist, an appeal shall lie in the manner prescribed

Rule 11 of the POSH Rules, 2013, which designates the "Appellate Authority" notified under Section 2(a) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, as the competent forum

Section 29 of the POSH Act regarding the Central Government’s power to frame rules for the "manner of appeal"

The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that a specific new notification was required after 2013 to empower the existing Appellate Authority. It reasoned that Section 18(1) and Rule 11 expressly incorporate the pre-existing machinery established under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

The Court clarified that the Notification dated 31.12.1979, which established the Appellate Authority under the 1946 Act, is sufficient and valid for purposes of the POSH Act by virtue of legal incorporation

Furthermore, the court held that while the Single Judge was correct in identifying the alternative remedy, he erred in making observations on the merits of the ICC report while simultaneously relegating the party to an appeal

Factual inquiries into ICC recommendations are generally impermissible under Article 226 when a statutory appeal is available

The Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal but modified the Single Judge’s order by setting aside the observations made on the merits of the case to ensure the Appellate Authority could decide the matter independently. The appellant was granted liberty to approach the Appellate Authority within the framework of the Act