Statutory parity cannot be claimed after inordinate delay by parties who previously acquiesced to the action.

The Petitioner (Respondent No. 1 herein) applied for development plan approval.

Pursuant to a Government Notification dated 20.05.2017, the Petitioner voluntarily executed a relinquishment deed on 22.01.2018, gifting 5% of its total land area to the Satellite Town Ring Road Planning Authority.

Years later, in 2022, a Single Judge of the High Court in a separate proceeding (W.P. No. 15250/2022) ruled that such mandatory 5% relinquishment was unconstitutional.

Consequently, the Petitioner filed W.P. No. 19058/2022 seeking similar relief and challenging the 2017 Notification.

The Single Judge allowed the petition, prompting the State to appeal on grounds of delay, laches, and acquiescence.

Whether a party who has voluntarily accepted a condition and executed a relinquishment deed can challenge the underlying notification after a considerable delay based on a subsequent judgment in another case.

Whether the principles of "fence-sitting" and "acquiescence" disentitle the petitioner from seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court applied the doctrine of "delay and laches," emphasizing that "delay defeats all rights".

It relied on the principle that similarly situated persons who act as "fence-sitters"—waiting for others to succeed in litigation before approaching the court—are not entitled to relief if they have previously acquiesced to the state action.

The Court cited *Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corp. Ltd. v. Ram Gopal* (2021) 13 SCC 225 regarding inordinate delay.

The Court cited *Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat* (2025) regarding the exclusion of parity rights for inactive litigants.

The Court cited *State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava* (2015) 1 SCC 347, which establishes that acquiescence is a valid ground to dismiss claims of similarly situated persons who wake up after long delays.

The Court reasoned that the Petitioner did not provide any plausible explanation for the delay in approaching the Court between the execution of the deed (2018) and the filing of the petition (2022).

By voluntarily executing the relinquishment deed in 2018, the Petitioner accepted the conditions of the 2017 Notification and was therefore estopped from challenging it later.

The Court determined that the Petitioner was a "fence-sitter" who only sought legal recourse because other parties were successful in 2022.

Even though the 5% relinquishment rule was found to violate Article 300A in other cases, the Petitioner’s prior active acquiescence and the resulting prejudice of time meant the principle of parity could not be invoked.

The Court held that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief due to inordinate delay, laches, and the principle of acquiescence, as the Petitioner had already acted upon the Notification by executing the Relinquishment Deed.

Final order: Writ Petition dismissed on the ground that delay defeats all rights.