Statutory protection of six months' notice under Section 21(1)(a) is personal to the tenant and capable of waiver.

The petitioner is a tenant of a shop in Bijnor, originally under an erstwhile owner before the respondent-landlord purchased the premises.

In 2014, the respondent filed a release application (P.A. Case No. 1 of 2014) under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, seeking the shop for his son’s business.

The petitioner contested the need and raised a jurisdictional objection, claiming the mandatory six-month notice required by the first proviso to Section 21(1)(a) was not satisfied, as notice was issued on 02.12.2013 and the suit filed on 15.01.2014.

The Prescribed Authority allowed the release in 2022, holding the need bona fide and finding the notice objection waived by the tenant’s conduct.

This was affirmed by the Appellate Court on 16.01.2026.

Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which mandates a three-year waiting period post-purchase and a six-month prior notice to the tenant before filing a release application.

The Supreme Court precedent Martin & Harris Ltd. v. Additional District Judge (1998), which established that while the six-month notice is mandatory, it is a procedural safeguard for the personal benefit of the tenant and is thus capable of being waived.

The Latin maxim quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto (anyone may waive a right introduced for their own benefit), as supported by Krishan Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of Madras.

The court reasoned that the six-month notice requirement does not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the authority but serves as a procedural protection for the tenant.

Applying Martin & Harris Ltd., the court observed that if a tenant participates in proceedings on merits without timely pressing the notice objection, they lose the right to challenge the suit as premature.

In this case, the petitioner entered appearance in 2014, filed interrogatories, and sought numerous adjournments for seven years before finally raising the notice plea in a written statement in 2021.

The court held that such "prolonged participation" and "conscious inaction" constituted a waiver by conduct.

It emphasized that the law does not allow a party to keep a technical objection in reserve only to revive it at a belated stage after testing the merits of the case.

The court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the landlord’s requirement was bona fide and the hardship weighed in his favor, noting that concurrent findings of fact do not warrant interference under the limited supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 unless patently perverse.

The impugned judgments of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court were upheld.