Statutory revisional powers cannot reopen settled land transactions after unreasonable and unexplained delay.

Petitioner No. 1, an agricultural labourer, purchased agricultural land at Village Zamrala through a registered sale deed in 1973; the related revenue entry was mutated and certified. Following a family arrangement, the names of his sons, Petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, were subsequently entered in the revenue record.

In 2000, Petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 purchased another parcel of agricultural land from Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 through a registered sale deed, pursuant to which Revenue Entry No. 1142 was mutated and certified.

In 2012, Respondent No. 3 complained that the petitioners were not agriculturists and had purchased agricultural land without prior permission. Proceedings were initiated under Sections 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949.

The Collector, after considering the material, withdrew the proceedings on 13 November 2014, finding no statutory breach.

On Respondent No. 3’s revision application, the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals and Revision) set aside the Collector’s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by order dated 13 October 2017, principally because sufficient documentary evidence of Petitioner No. 1’s agricultural-labourer status had allegedly not been produced.

The petitioners challenged the remand order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Sections 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, governing the validity and consequences of transfers of agricultural land.

It held that even where a statute does not prescribe a limitation period for the exercise of suo motu or revisional power, that power must be exercised within a reasonable period and cannot be used to unsettle long-standing transactions after unexplained and inordinate delay.

The Court relied on State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187; Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71; Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale, (2009) 9 SCC 353; and Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (2) GLR 1788, which establish that statutory powers without a specified limitation period must nevertheless be exercised within a reasonable time.

It also relied on Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695, holding that unexplained and inordinate delay in exercising revisional power is arbitrary, contrary to the rule of law, and may itself amount to a fraud upon the statute.

The Court found that the 1973 registered sale deed had been followed by mutation and certification of the relevant revenue entry, and that the petitioners’ asserted rights had thereafter remained reflected in the revenue record for a considerable period.

The subsequent 2000 registered sale deed and corresponding certified revenue entry were also left unchallenged until 2012.

Applying the reasonable-time doctrine, the Court held that reopening the transaction after approximately 39 years, without any satisfactory explanation for the delay, was impermissible.

The absence of a statutory limitation period did not authorise the revenue authorities to exercise their power indefinitely or unsettle crystallised rights.

The SSRD therefore erred in remanding the matter for further evidence regarding the petitioners’ agriculturist status without first determining whether such an inquiry could legally be undertaken after such prolonged delay.

The Court also noted that Respondent No. 3 had been a party to the subsequent registered sale transaction, had not challenged the sale deed before a civil court, and could not seek to reopen the transaction before the revenue authorities after such an extended period.

The petition was allowed; the SSRD’s order dated 13 October 2017 in Revision Application No. MVV/GRKH/BTD/3/2015 was quashed and set aside, and the Collector’s order dated 13 November 2014 withdrawing the proceedings under Sections 54 and 75 of the Ordinance was confirmed and restored.

Rule was made absolute to that extent.