Statutory separation and cooling-off periods under the Special Marriage Act may be waived in cases of exceptional hardship.

The appellant and respondent, followers of different faiths, solemnized their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA) on 25.08.2025

Following the marriage, the appellant’s father suffered a severe health crisis (liver failure) upon learning of the union, and the family severed ties

the respondent hid the marriage from her family to avoid similar disownment

The marriage was never consummated, and no cohabitation occurred

The parties filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent along with an application to waive the one-year mandatory waiting period under Section 29 and the six-month cooling-off period under Section 28(2) of the Act

The Family Court dismissed the application on 15.10.2025, ruling that the case did not disclose "exceptional hardship"

1. Whether the statutory one-year period for presenting a divorce petition under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act can be waived in cases of "exceptional hardship"

2. Whether the specific circumstances of familial estrangement and lack of consummation in this case constitute "exceptional hardship"

The Court applied Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which restricts divorce petitions within the first year of marriage unless "exceptional hardship" to the petitioner or "exceptional depravity" by the respondent is shown

Section 28 of the SMA regarding the six-month cooling-off period

Sections 28 and 29 of the SMA are pari materia to Sections 13B and 14 of the HMA

Full Bench decision in Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar (2025), which established that the one-year separation period can be waived if the court is satisfied of exceptional hardship

Supreme Court precedents in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) and Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal (2021), which held that statutory waiting periods are directory, not mandatory, when continuation of the marriage serves no purpose

The High Court found that the Family Court adopted a "hyper-technical" and "restrictive" approach by insisting on efforts toward cohabitation for a marriage that was "unworkable from inception"

The Court reasoned that since the marriage was purely notional—lacking cohabitation, consummation, or social recognition—enforcing the statutory waiting period would only prolong the parties' agony

The Court determined that the appellant’s familial displacement, his father’s medical crisis, and the respondent’s fear of similar consequences collectively met the threshold of "exceptional hardship"

judicial discretion must be exercised to waive timelines when the legislative intent of stability is outweighed by unavoidable mental and social distress

The application for waiver was allowed, the divorce petition under Section 28(1) was revived, and the matter was remanded to the Family Court for expedited disposal without insisting on the one-year separation period. The Court further directed the Family Court to consider waiving the six-month cooling-off period