Stigmatic termination of a contractual employee without a regular departmental enquiry is legally unsustainable.

The petitioner, working as a Gram Rojgar Sahayak (contractual employment) at Gram Panchayat Negama, Guna, challenged the order dated July 10, 2017

which terminated his services.

The termination order stated that despite multiple opportunities, the petitioner failed to improve his performance and discharge his duties effectively, leading to the decision not to extend his contract.

The petitioner contended that the order was "stigmatic" in nature and was passed without conducting a regular departmental enquiry.

An interim order dated November 7, 2017, had stayed the operation of the termination.

1. Whether the termination order dated July 10, 2017, is stigmatic in nature

2. Whether the services of a contractual or temporary employee can be terminated via a stigmatic order without conducting a regular departmental enquiry.

The Court applied the principle that if even a temporary or contractual employee's termination is founded on allegations of misconduct or dereliction of duty that casts a stigma, a regular departmental enquiry is mandatory under the principles of natural justice.

It relied on *Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission* (2001) and *Jitendra v. State of M.P.* (2008), which establish that stigmatic orders entail serious consequences for future prospects and require an inquiry.

The Court also cited *Khem Chand v. Union of India* (1958) regarding the three components of "reasonable opportunity": notice of charges, opportunity to cross-examine/defend, and representation against proposed punishment.

Furthermore, it referenced Clause 16 of the MANREGA guidelines, which necessitates proof of gross negligence or irregularities before termination.

The Court examined the language of the impugned order, which explicitly attributed the termination to a failure to improve performance and neglect of "official duties" (*inhonous drtyavyohon*).

The Court found that such phrasing directly questioned the petitioner's conduct and character, making the order "stigmatic" rather than a termination *simpliciter*.

Applying the settled legal position, the Court reasoned that because the termination was founded on acts of omission and commission amounting to misconduct, the respondents were legally bound to hold a full departmental enquiry.

The Court noted that no charge-sheet was issued and no evidence was produced to show an enquiry was conducted with the petitioner’s participation.

Consequently, the lack of a formal enquiry rendered the termination procedurally flawed and violative of Article 226/natural justice principles.

The petition was allowed; the impugned orders dated July 10, 2017, and June 6, 2017, were set aside.

Since the petitioner was already protected by an interim stay, the Court directed the respondents to grant him all consequential benefits.

Liberty was granted to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with the law if deemed necessary.