### Subjective satisfaction to dispense with inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) must be based on objective facts, not conjectures.

The appellant, a Constable in the Delhi Police, was dismissed from service on 18.07.2017 by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP).

The dismissal was executed under Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, dispensing with a formal departmental inquiry.

The justification provided was a preliminary inquiry by the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) suggesting that the appellant’s alleged involvement in a robbery (FIR No. 390/2017) and ties to criminals made it "not reasonably practicable" to hold an inquiry due to potential witness intimidation.

At the time of the dismissal order, the appellant was in judicial custody.

The dismissal was upheld by the Appellate Authority, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), and the Delhi High Court.

Whether the disciplinary authority’s satisfaction that it was "not reasonably practicable" to hold an inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) was based on relevant material or was an arbitrary exercise of power.

Whether the constitutional protection under Article 311(2) can be dispensed with solely on the basis of a preliminary inquiry report alleging a "possibility" of witness intimidation without specific instances of threat.

The Court applied Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which mandates a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the second proviso (b), which permits dispensing with inquiries if "not reasonably practicable".

It relied heavily on the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, establishing that while Article 14 cannot override the second proviso, the "satisfaction" of the authority is subject to judicial review to ensure it is not mala fide or based on irrelevant grounds.

The Court also referenced Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, holding that the decision to dispense with an inquiry cannot rest on the ipse dixit of the authority and must be supported by objective facts.

Furthermore, it cited Sections 21 and 22 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, and Rules 5, 6, 14, and 16 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, regarding major penalties.

The Court scrutinized the ACP’s preliminary inquiry report and found that while it detailed the criminal allegations, the statements of the complainant and police witnesses contained no mention of actual threats, trauma, or intimidation by the appellant.

The Court observed that the DCP’s satisfaction was based on mere "presumption" and "conjectures" rather than objective material.

Crucially, the Court noted that the appellant was in custody during the preliminary inquiry and the passing of the dismissal order, making the claim that he was currently "traumatizing" witnesses through associates unsubstantiated without specific instances of communication from jail.

The Court found that the disciplinary authority failed to follow the Department’s own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007), which cautioned against using Article 311(2)(b) as a "short cut" in heinous crimes where a departmental inquiry could nonetheless be conveniently held.

By failing to record "cogent and legally tenable reasons," the authority abused its power.

The Court held that the constitutional right to an inquiry cannot be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily.

The appellant was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and notionally granted consequential benefits; however, back wages were restricted to 50% given the pending criminal case.

The Court reserved the right of the respondents to initiate a fresh departmental inquiry in accordance with the law.