Subsequent execution notices neither revive limitation nor justify condoning unexplained inordinate delay.

The appellant filed a miscellaneous appeal against an award dated 30 August 2022 after a delay of approximately 1,334 days, stated in the order as three years and eight months.

He sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act through I.A. No. 16654/2026.

The appellant contended that he became aware of the execution proceedings only after repeated notices from the Executing Court.

He further submitted that he had deposited his share of the awarded compensation, together with interest, on 27 June 2025 in Execution Case No. MJC-16/2023, but recovery notices were subsequently issued.

He claimed to have obtained copies of the execution proceedings in July 2026 and thereafter filed the appeal.

Whether the appellant had established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay of approximately 1,334 days in filing the appeal?

Whether the appellant’s subsequent knowledge of, and participation in, execution proceedings could extend or revive the limitation period for challenging the original award?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned only where the applicant establishes sufficient cause explaining the delay for the entire period.

It relied on Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, for the principles that stale and belated claims cannot ordinarily be entertained on grounds of equity, that “delay defeats equity,” and that courts assist vigilant litigants rather than those who sleep over their rights.

The Court also relied on Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Others, AIR 2022 SC 332, which followed the same approach.

Further, relying on Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, Civil Appeal No. 11794/2025, the Court reiterated that negligence, lethargy, and lack of vigilance do not constitute sufficient cause and that limitation serves the objective of finality in litigation.

The Court found that the appellant had not satisfactorily explained the entire period of delay.

The award had been passed on 30 August 2022, while the appeal was filed only after approximately three years and eight months.

The appellant’s own conduct—particularly depositing his share of the compensation with interest before the Executing Court on 27 June 2025—demonstrated that he had knowledge of both the award and the execution proceedings.

Despite that knowledge, he did not approach the High Court within a reasonable time.

The later issuance of recovery notices could not create a fresh cause of action or extend the limitation period for challenging the original award.

Applying the requirement of due diligence under Section 5 and the principles against condoning stale claims, the Court held that the explanation reflected negligence rather than circumstances beyond the appellant’s control.

I.A. No. 16654/2026 seeking condonation of delay was accordingly dismissed, and, as a consequence, Misc. Appeal No. 6395 of 2026 was also dismissed.