Subsequent life imprisonment runs consecutively to a prior term sentence absent specific judicial direction for concurrency.

The petitioner was first convicted in Sessions Case No. 100/2006 on April 29, 2008, for kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 376, 506 IPC) and sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment

He was subsequently convicted in Sessions Case No. 04/2007 on June 17, 2008, for the murder and rape of a six-year-old girl (Sections 302, 363, 364, 376, 201 IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment

This second conviction was confirmed on appeal in 2010

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to treat both sentences as running concurrently under Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C., arguing he had already undergone over 19 years of imprisonment

The court primarily interpreted Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. regarding sentences for offenders already sentenced for another offence

Section 427(1) mandates that a subsequent sentence commences after the expiration of a previous term sentence unless the court directs concurrency

Section 427(2) is an exception, providing that if a person already undergoing life imprisonment is subsequently sentenced to a term or life imprisonment, the sentences shall run concurrently

The court relied on Mutthuramlingam v. State (2016) 8 SCC 313, which clarifies that a court may direct a prisoner to first undergo a term sentence before the commencement of a life sentence

It further cited Mohd. Zahid v. State through NCB (2022) 12 SCC 426, establishing that concurrent sentences are generally not awarded for different transactions and different crime numbers unless specifically directed

The court found that the petitioner’s case falls under Section 427(1), not Section 427(2), because he was not "already undergoing life imprisonment" when the subsequent sentence was passed; rather, he was undergoing a fixed-term sentence

Under Section 427(1), the default rule is consecutive sentencing unless the trial or appellate court specifically directs concurrency, which was absent in this case

The court distinguished the petitioner's cited precedents (Benson, Vicky, and Mahadev Sillode) noting they either involved two-term sentences or situations where life imprisonment was the first sentence imposed

Furthermore, the court emphasized the "gruesome and brutal nature" of the offences—the rape and murder of a minor—as a factor in declining to exercise discretionary power under Article 226 to grant concurrency

The High Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, finding the petition devoid of substance. The Writ Petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged