Subsequent Purchaser Lacks Locus to Seek Leave to Appeal where Separate Substantive Suit is Pending

The Appellant, Anil, filed two applications: one for impleadment in RSA 64/2024 and another for "Leave to Appeal" (RSA 72/2025) against a judgment dated 24.12.2018.

Respondent No. 1 (Anita Gupta) claimed ownership via a registered Sale Deed dated 27.04.2004 from Sanjay Kumar.

Appellant claimed he purchased the property on 14.12.2007 from Respondent No. 3 (Anita Rani, Sanjay’s widow), asserting that he is a bona fide purchaser in possession for 17 years.

The Trial Court initially dismissed Anita Gupta’s suit for possession, but the First Appellate Court reversed this on 24.12.2018, decreeing the suit in her favor.

The Appellant, having been denied impleadment in the first appeal, sought to contest the second appeal after warrants of possession were issued in 2024.

1. Whether a subsequent purchaser (pendente lite) has the locus standi to be impleaded or grant of leave to appeal in a Regular Second Appeal when they were not a party to the original suit or first appeal.

2. Whether the interests of a subsequent purchaser can be adjudicated within the scope of a Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC when separate substantive litigation for title is pending.

Section 100 regarding the scope of Regular Second Appeals, Section 146 regarding proceedings by or against representatives, and Order I Rule 10 regarding the addition of parties.

Order XXII Rule 10 involving the devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit.

A subsequent purchaser steps into the shoes of their vendor and cannot claim a title superior to that which the vendor possessed at the time of the transfer.

The Court reasoned that the Appellant, as a subsequent purchaser, derived his title from Respondent No. 3 (Anita Rani) and is therefore bound by the legal standing of his predecessor-in-interest.

Respondent No. 1 (Anita Gupta) held a registered Sale Deed from 2004, which predated the Appellant's purported purchase in 2007.

The Appellant’s rights as a "representative-in-interest" do not grant him an independent locus in a Second Appeal, which is strictly restricted to substantial questions of law.

The Appellant has already initiated a separate substantive suit for Declaration, Specific Performance, and Injunction (CS DJ 747/2024) to establish his title, making his intervention in the present appellate proceedings unnecessary and inappropriate.

The Court held that the Appellant has no locus standi in the Second Regular Appeal as his rights are subject to the title of his vendors and because he has already sought a remedy through a separate substantive suit.

Liberty was granted to the Appellant to pursue his grievances in the "Appropriate Forum" where his independent suit is currently pending.