Successive representations against stale claims do not revive limitation or create a fresh cause of action.

The appellant was initially appointed as an adhoc Assistant Teacher in 1980-1981 but was later removed.

Following a State Administrative Tribunal order, a Screening Committee considered his case; however, instead of being appointed as an Assistant Teacher, the appellant was appointed as a Shiksha Karmi Varg-III on 13/07/1999.

After 12 years of silence, the appellant filed W.P. No. 7123/2011, which was disposed of with a direction to the State to consider his representation.

The State rejected the representation on 17/10/2012.

The appellant then filed W.P. No. 3044/2014 (and the present W.P. No. 25701/2021), which the learned Single Judge dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches.

1. Whether a fresh cause of action arises when an authority decides a representation in compliance with a court directive in a stale or time-barred matter

2. Whether the appellant’s 12-year delay in challenging his 1999 appointment status can be condoned based on successive representations

The Court applied the doctrine of "Delay and Laches" under Article 226 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the law favors the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights.

It relied on State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (2013) to establish that a "dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix" and court-ordered considerations do not revive stale claims.

It further applied principles from C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining (2008) and Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar (2010), holding that a fresh decision on a belated representation does not furnish a new cause of action or erase past delay.

The Court observed that the appellant’s primary grievance stemmed from his appointment in 1999, yet he only approached the High Court in 2011, leaving a 12-year gap unexplained.

The Court reasoned that the 2011 High Court order directing the State to "consider the representation" was merely a procedural instruction and did not validate the merits of the underlying stale claim.

Applying the cited precedents, the Court found that the rejection of the representation in 2012 did not create a new starting point for limitation.

The Court determined that repetitive representations are "extra-legal" and do not arrest the period of limitation or provide a sufficient explanation for inordinate delay.

Consequently, the Court found no error in the Single Judge’s refusal to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction.

The Court condoned the 230-day delay in filing the appeal itself [para. 4] but dismissed the Writ Appeal on merits, affirming the Single Judge's order.