Suggestions by defense counsel during cross-examination do not constitute confession of the accused to sustain conviction for rape.

The complainant/victim lodged an FIR on 01.12.2005, alleging that on the previous night, the appellant scaled her boundary wall, entered her room through a window, and raped her in the presence of her children while her husband was away working in Ludhiana.

The victim claimed she suffered injuries from biting and beating.

While the trial court acquitted the appellant under Sections 457 and 323 of the IPC for lack of evidence regarding house-trespass and physical injury, it convicted him under Section 376 IPC (rape), sentencing him to seven years of rigorous imprisonment.

The trial court based this conviction on the victim’s testimony and an interpretation that the defense's suggestions during cross-examination amounted to a confession of physical relations.

1. Whether the uncorroborated testimony of the victim was of "sterling quality" sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape despite contradictions with medical evidence.

2. Whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution for non-production of the pathological report and non-examination of a material witness.

3. Whether suggestions put forth by defense counsel during cross-examination can be treated as a confession by the accused.

The Court applied Section 376 of the IPC regarding rape and examined the evidentiary standards for a victim's sole testimony.

It relied on Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, which allows a court to presume that evidence withheld by a party would be unfavourable to them.

The Court cited Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of M.P. (2006) regarding adverse inference for non-examination of material witnesses.

The Court cited Davinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2023), which emphasizes that withholding a witness who would "unfold the genesis of the incident" creates a gap in the prosecution's case.

The Court found the victim's testimony unreliable as it was contradicted by the medico-legal report (PW-5), which found no injuries on her body despite her claim of being bitten and beaten.

The prosecution’s failure to produce the pathological report of the vaginal swab and the failure to examine the victim’s eldest child (who was present) led the court to draw an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, suggesting such evidence would not have supported the prosecution.

The Court deemed the incident "highly improbable," noting that 4-5 children allegedly slept peacefully while their mother was forcibly raped in the same room.

Most significantly, the High Court held that the trial court’s reasoning was "perverse" regarding the defense's cross-examination; a suggestion made by counsel to a witness is not an admission or confession by the accused and cannot shift the burden of proof.

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 15.03.2012, and acquitted the appellant of all charges. The appellant was directed to furnish a personal bond under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. to ensure presence in case of further appeal.