Suit for Defamation is Governed by the One-Year Limitation Period under Articles 75 and 76.

The Appellant, a Telecom Mechanic at 505 Army Base Workshop, was served a Show Cause Notice on 01.07.2022 regarding allegedly fake medical certificates.

During the subsequent departmental inquiry, the Respondent (a Foreman in the same department) deposed as a witness on 10.11.2022, stating the Appellant was a habitual absentee and rarely attended office.

While the Inquiry Officer found the Appellant guilty, the Disciplinary Authority eventually rejected the report and dropped all charges on 29.10.2024.

On 11.09.2025, the Appellant filed a suit for damages (Rs. 10,00,000/-) alleging that the Respondent’s false testimony caused mental agony and tarnished his reputation.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 13.03.2026, holding it was a suit for defamation and was barred by limitation.

1. Whether the suit was governed by the limitation period for defamation (Articles 75/76) or the residuary provision (Article 113) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. Whether the cause of action for a defamation claim in a departmental inquiry arises on the date of the statement or the date of the final exoneration.

3. Whether the Respondent's act of deposing as a witness could constitute "malicious prosecution" to attract Article 74 of the Limitation Act.

The court applied Articles 75 and 76 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribe a one-year limitation period for libel (from publication) and slander (from the speaking of words).

It rejected the application of the residuary Article 113 (three-year period), noting it only applies if no specific article covers the suit.

Regarding malicious prosecution, the court applied the principle that the defendant must be "actively instrumental" in setting the law in motion without reasonable cause and with malice.

The court also reaffirmed that the nature of a suit is determined by the "pith and substance" of the pleadings rather than the label given to the relief.

The court observed that the Appellant's own pleadings in paragraphs 15 and 16 explicitly characterized the claim as one for the "tort of defamation" and "loss of reputation".

Consequently, specific Articles 75 and 76 applied, ousting the residuary Article 113.

The court found that the cause of action accrued on 10.11.2022 when the statement was made in the Appellant's presence, not on 29.10.2024 when he was exonerated; the latter was a subsequent event in a separate proceeding.

Furthermore, the court held the suit could not be treated as "malicious prosecution" because the Department—not the Respondent—initiated the proceedings.

The Respondent acted merely as a witness, and the torts of defamation and malicious prosecution are distinct legal domains with different ingredients that cannot be interchanged to circumvent limitation laws.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court’s judgment, dismissing the appeal.

The court concluded that neither the doctrine of "continuing wrong" nor the theory of "malicious prosecution" applied to the facts of the case.