Supercession of general notifications does not extinguish specific statutory powers conferred upon the Director (Sugar) as Registrar.

The petitioners, members of Shree Kantha Vibhag Sahkari Mandli Ltd. (a sugar manufacturing society), challenged a notification dated 02.09.1985

This notification, issued under Section 3(3) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, conferred the powers of the "Registrar" upon the Director (Sugar)

In 2025, the Director (Sugar) initiated proceedings under Section 93 of the Act against the petitioners for alleged financial irregularities exceeding Rs. 34 Crores

The petitioners contended that the 1985 notification was superseded by a subsequent notification dated 21.07.2011, thereby stripping the Director (Sugar) of the authority to initiate the inquiry

They also argued that the Director (Sugar) is not a statutory authority under the Act and cannot exercise quasi-judicial powers under Section 93

1. Whether the notification dated 02.09.1985 conferring powers on the Director (Sugar) was superseded by the notification dated 21.07.2011

2. Whether the Director (Sugar) lacks the jurisdiction to initiate and delegate inquiry proceedings under Section 93 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act

Section 3(3) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, which permits the State Government to confer the powers of the Registrar on any officer

Section 93 of the Act, which empowers the Registrar or an authorized person to assess damages against delinquent directors/officers

The principle of Stare Decisis regarding the findings of a Co-ordinate Bench in Special Civil Application Nos. 8875 of 2025 & 9351 of 2025, which confirmed the validity of Section 93 proceedings in this specific matter

The interpretative principle that the phrase "in supersession of all the notifications issued in this behalf" must be read in the context of the specific subject matter of the new notification, as held in Rughnathpura Saurashtra Nagrik Dhiran Sahkari Mandli Ltd v. State of Gujarat

The Court noted that a Co-ordinate Bench and a Division Bench had already upheld the initiation of Section 93 proceedings against other committee members in the same society, concluding that the decision to authorize an inquiry is an administrative function and not a quasi-judicial one requiring a pre-inquiry hearing

Regarding the validity of the 1985 notification, the Court rejected the petitioners' "supersession" argument. It held that the 2011 notification was intended to confer powers on subordinate officers in different cadres (specifically housing societies) and did not disturb the specific conferment of powers upon the Director (Sugar) established in 1982/1985

The Court determined that the phrase "in this behalf" in the 2011 notification limited the scope of supersession to only those notifications dealing with similar subordinate delegations, leaving the 1985 notification intact

The Court ruled that the 2011 notification did not supersede the 1985 notification as they operated in different specific contexts

The petitioners were granted liberty to raise their merits-based contentions before the Authorized Officer conducting the Section 93 inquiry, who must decide the matter independently. The request for an extension of interim relief was refused