Suppression of the earliest version vitiates conviction when a subsequent fardbeyan is improperly treated as the FIR.

The prosecution alleged that, on 19 February 1989, an armed group assembled near the house of Kameshwar Singh, forcibly entered it, caused injuries, murdered his sisters Neelam Kumari and Leela Kumari, and committed theft.

The police registered Ahiyapur P.S. Case No. 23 of 1989 under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act.

Fifteen accused faced trial; ten were acquitted and the present appellants were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302/149 IPC, besides sentences under the other charged provisions.

The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses.

The informant, Kameshwar Singh, was not an eyewitness to the actual assault, while Ram Pari Devi was treated as the principal eyewitness.

Whether the fardbeyan treated as the FIR could be relied upon when the prosecution had allegedly suppressed the informant’s earlier statement and written complaint to the Superintendent of Police?

Whether the evidence of the informant and the alleged eyewitness reliably established the appellants’ identity and participation in the murders, house-breaking, assault and theft?

Whether the prosecution had proved the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite contradictions regarding the identity of the assailants and the suppressed initial version?

The Court applied the principle that the earliest information relating to the commission of an offence must be treated as the first information, and that a subsequent statement cannot be used as an FIR if an earlier information had already been given to the police.

Such a subsequent statement would be subject to Section 162 CrPC and could not be used as substantive evidence.

The Court further relied on the rule that suppression of the earliest version of the prosecution case may justify an adverse inference where it creates doubt regarding the genesis and subsequent development of the prosecution story.

This principle was supported by Allarakha Habib Memon Etc. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2024 SC 4201.

The offences alleged involved Sections 302/149, 307/149, 452/149 and 380 IPC, but conviction could be sustained only if the prosecution established the accused persons’ participation beyond reasonable doubt.

Medical and physical evidence could corroborate an occurrence but could not, by itself, establish the identity or guilt of the appellants.

The Court found that Kameshwar had not witnessed the actual assault: he allegedly saw persons gathered outside, fled from the house, heard firing from a distance, and subsequently went to the police station.

His evidence was therefore insufficient to prove who committed the murders.

The Court also accepted the defence contention that an earlier statement at the police station and a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police had not been produced.

Since the prosecution failed to disclose the earliest version, the Court held that the fardbeyan treated as the FIR could be a later statement under Section 161 CrPC, attracting Section 162 CrPC and undermining the prosecution case.

Ram Pari Devi’s evidence established that she had suffered a firearm injury and that Ashok Singh allegedly fired at her, which was corroborated by the medical evidence.

However, she did not identify the persons who actually murdered Neelam Kumari and Leela Kumari.

Her account also differed materially from Kameshwar’s evidence regarding the persons assembled outside and the persons who entered the house.

The Court consequently held that the witnesses’ identification evidence was inconsistent and that the medical evidence only proved Ram Pari Devi’s injury, not the appellants’ participation in the charged offences.

The suppression of the initial version created a substantial and unresolved doubt regarding the genesis and reliability of the prosecution case.

The suppressed initial information, the doubtful status of the fardbeyan as the FIR, and the material inconsistencies in the eyewitness evidence created a reasonable doubt regarding the appellants’ involvement.

The conviction judgment dated 24 September 2019 and the order of sentence dated 27 September 2019 were set aside.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were directed to be released from custody forthwith unless required in any other case.