Supreme Court affirms power to modify life imprisonment to fixed-term sentence exceeding fourteen years.

The appellant (A-2) was tried alongside three others for the 1998 murder of a victim involving knife injuries to the torso and abdomen.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, sentencing him to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, while acquitting the other three accused.

The High Court of Gujarat confirmed the conviction in 2002.

At the time of this appeal, the appellant had already undergone actual imprisonment for approximately 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 135 of the BP Act merit interference by the Supreme Court.

2. Whether a sentence of life imprisonment can be modified to a fixed-term sentence representing the period already undergone (exceeding 14 years) without such modification amounting to an impermissible enhancement.

The Court applied Section 302 of the IPC and Section 135 of the BP Act regarding criminal liability.

Relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), the Court affirmed that "imprisonment for life" means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life, subject to constitutional remission powers.

Using principles from Shiva Kumar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka (2023) and Birbal Choudhary alias Mukhiya Jee v. State of Bihar (2018), the Court established that Constitutional Courts have the power to modify a life sentence to a fixed term of more than 14 years, and such a modification is a reduction/modification rather than an "enhancement" of sentence.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding the eyewitness testimony of PWs 1, 2, and 5 reliable and corroborated by medical evidence and the discovery of the weapon.

Regarding the sentence, the Court reasoned that while life imprisonment technically spans the natural life of the convict, judicial precedent allows the Supreme Court to modify it to a fixed term.

Given that the appellant was only 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already served over 23 years of actual incarceration, the Court found it a fit case for modification.

The Court noted that since the modified term exceeds the 14-year statutory floor (Section 433-A CrPC) and is a reduction from a "natural life" sentence, it is legally permissible and requires no notice of enhancement.

The Court held that the appellant's sentence is modified to the period already undergone (23 years, 6 months, and 3 days).

The Court directed that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.