Surplus-land vesting cannot defeat repeal benefits absent proof of actual possession.

The petitioner sought to set aside the Collector’s order dated 30 May 2022 rejecting his representation, to quash the mutation in favour of respondent No. 4, and to have his own name entered in the revenue records for the disputed land.

He contended that, although the land had been declared surplus under the urban land-ceiling proceedings, the State had not taken possession and he was entitled to the benefit of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.

The State relied on a notice dated 29 February 1992, said to have been received by the petitioner on 2 March 1992, and maintained that possession had been taken.

However, the State’s return also contained a possession document recording that possession had been handed over on 9 February 1991.

Despite an earlier direction, the State did not produce the underlying record.

1. Whether the State established that it had taken de facto possession of the disputed land in accordance with Sections 10(5) or 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, so as to defeat the petitioner’s claim under the Repeal Act.

2. Whether the petitioner’s claim was barred by delay, given the State’s assertion that possession had been taken years earlier.

Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 preserves the landholder’s claim where possession of the surplus land was not taken before repeal.

Under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the 1976 Act, possession requires, as applicable, voluntary surrender, peaceful delivery following notice, or lawful forcible dispossession; mere vesting of land in the State does not establish de facto possession.

The notice requirements under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) are mandatory, and the State must establish possession through cogent evidence (State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, as discussed at para. 12; M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors., discussed at para. 13; Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., discussed at para. 14).

The Court distinguished the delay principles in State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and State of U.P. v. Ehsan: a belated challenge may be impermissible where possession was actually taken long ago, but that principle does not resolve a case in which actual possession has not been established.

The State’s evidence was internally inconsistent: one document recorded possession on 9 February 1991, while the State’s pleadings and the Collector’s order relied on a notice dated 29 February 1992 requiring possession to be delivered by 3 March 1992.

The 1991 document lacked a countersignature, and the State produced no document showing that possession was taken after the 1992 notice.

Nor did it produce the underlying record, despite the Court’s direction to do so; the Court therefore drew an adverse inference against the State.

Applying the rule that vesting alone is insufficient and that the State must prove actual possession, the Court found that the State had not discharged its burden.

The delay objection also failed because the State’s asserted date of possession was contradicted by its own reliance on a later possession notice, and actual possession had not been proved.

It set aside the Collector’s order dated 30 May 2022, quashed the ceiling proceedings, and directed that the land be mutated in the petitioner’s favour in the revenue records.

The petition was allowed and disposed of.