Suspension of Sentence Refused in Waging War Against State Cases Despite Lack of Test Identification Parade

The petitioner, Arnab Dam, and 22 others were convicted for a 2010 terrorist attack on the Silda Camp of the Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) where 24 personnel were killed and arms were looted.

He was convicted under various sections of the IPC, UAPA, Explosive Substances Act, and Arms Act, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The petitioner has spent approximately 9 years in custody (7 years pre-conviction and 2 years post-conviction).

He filed for suspension of sentence pending appeal, arguing that the evidence was weak, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted, and that he is a Ph.D. scholar with no prior convictions.

The State opposed the bail, citing his leadership role in a banned Maoist organization and his involvement in 15 other pending criminal cases.

The Court applied the sentencing and liability provisions under Sections 121 (waging war against the State), 121A (conspiracy), 122 (collecting arms), and 302 (murder) of the IPC.

It further relied on Sections 16(1)(a), 18, and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 regarding terrorist acts and membership, along with the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Arms Act, 1959.

The Court observed the principle that while TIP is a useful tool, dock identification by injured eyewitnesses is a substantial piece of evidence.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the evidence was weak, noting that three prosecution witnesses (two injured personnel and one independent witness) identified him in court.

The Court reasoned that the absence of a TIP is not fatal to the case when injured eyewitnesses, who are likely to remember the faces of their attackers due to the gravity of the incident, provide dock identification.

Applying the law to the facts, the Court found that the offences—including waging war against the State and the murder of 24 police personnel—were of "exceptional gravity".

The court further noted that since the appeal was filed in 2024, there was no "undue delay" violating Article 21 that would justify suspension of sentence at this stage.

It held that there was sufficient prima facie incriminating evidence against the petitioner to disentitle him to bail, given the heinous nature of the crimes.

The Court directed the Superintendent of the Correctional Home to provide the petitioner with reasonable facilities to pursue his Ph.D. research.