Suspension period post-acquittal to be treated as on duty, but without back wages.

The applicant, Harish Deshwal, a TGT (Science) under Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, was placed under suspension effective January 2, 2009, following his arrest in a criminal case under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

On August 4, 2011, the competent criminal court acquitted the applicant of all charges

After his acquittal, the applicant made several representations for the revocation of his suspension and reinstatement, which was eventually revoked on July 19, 2013, and he was posted to JNV Chamoli

A show cause notice was issued on March 14, 2014, proposing to treat the suspension period as not spent on duty and to deny full pay and allowances

The applicant's reply dated May 23, 2014, was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, NVS, Lucknow Region, via an order dated September 12, 2014

An appeal against this order was disposed of on November 8, 2017

The applicant filed the present Original Application seeking to quash these orders and obtain full pay and allowances for the suspension period

1. Whether the order dated September 12, 2014, treating the applicant's suspension period as not spent on duty and denying full pay and allowances, is arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to settled principles of law, particularly given his acquittal on merits

2. Whether the principle of "No Work No Pay" is applicable to the entire suspension period, especially where a significant portion of the delay in reinstatement occurred after the applicant's acquittal and was not attributable to him

The Tribunal primarily considered the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54-B concerning the treatment of a period of suspension, particularly in cases of acquittal

It also referenced the principle of "No Work No Pay," as elaborated in various judicial precedents.

Specifically, the Tribunal considered the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decisions in *Union of India & Ors. v. Jaipal Singh* and *Raj Narain v. Union of India*, which generally support the applicability of "No Work No Pay" when an employee is away from duty due to their own involvement in criminal proceedings

Conversely, it also applied the ruling in *Shobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. & others*, (2016) 16 SCC 663, and *U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & another v. Prayag Narain Dubey*, which hold that "No Work No Pay" does not apply when an employee is prevented from discharging duties through no fault of their own or due to reasons attributable to the employer

The Tribunal further considered the requirement for administrative or quasi-judicial orders to be reasoned and speaking, citing *Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P.*, AIR 1970 SC 1302

The Tribunal found that the applicant was under deemed suspension from November 14, 2008, when he was arrested, until his acquittal on August 4, 2011

During this period, the suspension was directly attributable to the criminal proceedings.

However, the applicant was acquitted on merits and no departmental proceedings were initiated against him

Crucially, after his acquittal on August 4, 2011, and intimation of release on August 11, 2011, the respondents delayed revoking his suspension until July 19, 2013, despite his repeated representations

The Tribunal distinguished the respondents' reliance on *Shivakar Singh v. State of U.P. and 5 others* because, in that case, there was an imprisonment period, whereas the present applicant was acquitted and no departmental proceedings followed

The Tribunal determined that the respondents' mechanical application of "No Work No Pay" for the entire period, particularly for the period after acquittal when the applicant was prevented from working due to administrative inaction, was not in consonance with settled principles and Fundamental Rule 54-B

The impugned order of September 12, 2014, was also deemed unstainable for lacking cogent reasons and being a non-speaking order

The respondents were directed to consider the period of suspension from November 14, 2008 (date of arrest) to August 4, 2011 (date of acquittal), in accordance with law

Further, the period from August 11, 2011 (date of intimation of release) to July 19, 2013 (date of suspension revocation), was directed to be treated as "on duty"

However, the applicant was not held entitled to any back wages for the said period

This exercise is to be completed within three months from the date of receipt of the order